The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
The maintenance of the body through its own powers is so small a degree of
the assertion of will, that if it voluntarily remains at this degree, we
might assume that, with the death of this body, the will also which
appeared in it would be extinguished. But even the satisfaction of the
sexual passions goes beyond the assertion of one’s own existence, which
fills so short a time, and asserts life for an indefinite time after the
death of the individual. Nature, always true and consistent, here even
naïve, exhibits to us openly the inner significance of the act of
generation. Our own consciousness, the intensity of the impulse, teaches
us that in this act the most decided _assertion of the will to live_
expresses itself, pure and without further addition (any denial of other
individuals); and now, as the consequence of this act, a new life appears
in time and the causal series, _i.e._, in nature; the begotten appears
before the begetter, different as regards the phenomenon, but in himself,
_i.e._, according to the Idea, identical with him. Therefore it is this
act through which every species of living creature binds itself to a whole
and is perpetuated. Generation is, with reference to the begetter, only
the expression, the symptom, of his decided assertion of the will to live:
with reference to the begotten, it is not the cause of the will which
appears in him, for the will in itself knows neither cause nor effect,
but, like all causes, it is merely the occasional cause of the phenomenal
appearance of this will at this time in this place. As thing-in-itself,
the will of the begetter and that of the begotten are not different, for
only the phenomenon, not the thing-in-itself, is subordinate to the
_principim individuationis_. With that assertion beyond our own body and
extending to the production of a new body, suffering and death, as
belonging to the phenomenon of life, have also been asserted anew, and the
possibility of salvation, introduced by the completest capability of
knowledge, has for this time been shown to be fruitless. Here lies the
profound reason of the shame connected with the process of generation.
This view is mythically expressed in the dogma of Christian theology that
we are all partakers in Adam’s first transgression (which is clearly just
the satisfaction of sexual passion), and through it are guilty of
suffering and death. In this theology goes beyond the consideration of
things according to the principle of sufficient reason, and recognises the
Idea of man, the unity of which is re-established out of its dispersion
into innumerable individuals through the bond of generation which holds
them all together. Accordingly it regards every individual as on one side
identical with Adam, the representative of the assertion of life, and, so
far, as subject to sin (original sin), suffering, and death; on the other
side, the knowledge of the Idea of man enables it to regard every