real significance both of the origin of the conceptions of wrong and
right, and of their application and position in ethics. 2. The deduction
of the law of property. 3. The deduction of the moral validity of
contracts; for this is the moral basis of the contract of the state. 4.
The explanation of the origin and the aim of the state, of the relation of
this aim to ethics, and of the intentional transference of the ethical
doctrine of right, by reversing it, to legislation, in consequence of this
relation. 5. The deduction of the right of punishment. The remaining
content of the doctrine of right is mere application of these principles,
mere accurate definition of the limits of right and wrong for all possible
relations of life, which are consequently united and distributed under
certain points of view and titles. In these special doctrines the books
which treat of pure law are fairly at one; it is only in the principles
that they differ much, for these are always connected with some
philosophical system. In connection with our system, we have explained the
first four of these principal points shortly and generally, yet definitely
and distinctly, and it remains for us to speak in the same way of the
right of punishment.
Kant makes the fundamentally false assertion that apart from the state
there would be no complete right of property. It follows from our
deduction, as given above, that even in a state of nature there is
property with complete natural, _i.e._, moral right, which cannot be
injured without wrong, but may without wrong be defended to the uttermost.
On the other hand, it is certain that apart from the state there is no
right of punishment. All right to punish is based upon the positive law
alone, which _before_ the offence has determined a punishment for it, the
threat of which, as a counter-motive, is intended to outweigh all possible
motives for the offence. This positive law is to be regarded as sanctioned
and recognised by all the members of the state. It is thus based upon a
common contract which the members of the state are in duty bound to
fulfil, and thus, on the one hand, to inflict the punishment, and, on the
other hand, to endure it; thus the endurance of the punishment may with
right be enforced. Consequently the immediate _end of punishment_ is, in
the particular case, _the fulfilment of the law as a contract_. But the
one end of the _law_ is _deterrence_ from the infringement of the rights
of others. For, in order that every one may be protected from suffering
wrong, men have combined to form a state, have renounced the doing of
wrong, and assumed the task of maintaining the state. Thus the law and the
fulfilment of it, the punishment, are essentially directed to the
_future_, not to the _past_. This distinguishes _punishment_ from
_revenge_; for the motives which instigate the latter are solely concerned
with what has happened, and thus with the past as such. All requital of