The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
That which is most certain, and yet always inexplicable, is what is
involved in the principle of sufficient reason, for this principle, in its
different aspects, expresses the universal form of all our ideas and
knowledge. All explanation consists of reduction to it, exemplification in
the particular case of the connection of ideas expressed generally through
it. It is thus the principle of all explanation, and therefore it is
neither susceptible of an explanation itself, nor does it stand in need of
it; for every explanation presupposes it, and only obtains meaning through
it. Now, none of its forms are superior to the rest; it is equally certain
and incapable of demonstration as the principle of the ground of being, or
of change, or of action, or of knowing. The relation of reason and
consequent is a necessity in all its forms, and indeed it is, in general,
the source of the concept of necessity, for necessity has no other
meaning. If the reason is given there is no other necessity than that of
the consequent, and there is no reason that does not involve the necessity
of the consequent. Just as surely then as the consequent expressed in the
conclusion follows from the ground of knowledge given in the premises,
does the ground of being in space determine its consequent in space: if I
know through perception the relation of these two, this certainty is just
as great as any logical certainty. But every geometrical proposition is
just as good an expression of such a relation as one of the twelve axioms;
it is a metaphysical truth, and as such, just as certain as the principle
of contradiction itself, which is a metalogical truth, and the common
foundation of all logical demonstration. Whoever denies the necessity,
exhibited for intuition or perception, of the space-relations expressed in
any proposition, may just as well deny the axioms, or that the conclusion
follows from the premises, or, indeed, he may as well deny the principle
of contradiction itself, for all these relations are equally
undemonstrable, immediately evident and known _a priori_. For any one to
wish to derive the necessity of space-relations, known in intuition or
perception, from the principle of contradiction by means of a logical
demonstration is just the same as for the feudal superior of an estate to
wish to hold it as the vassal of another. Yet this is what Euclid has
done. His axioms only, he is compelled to leave resting upon immediate
evidence; all the geometrical truths which follow are demonstrated
logically, that is to say, from the agreement of the assumptions made in
the proposition with the axioms which are presupposed, or with some
earlier proposition; or from the contradiction between the opposite of the
proposition and the assumptions made in it, or the axioms, or earlier
propositions, or even itself. But the axioms themselves have no more
immediate evidence than any other geometrical problem, but only more
simplicity on account of their smaller content.