Under such circumstances we see to what an extent reason
has mastered the animal nature, and we say to the strong: σιδηρειον νυ τοι
ἡτορ! (_ferreum certe tibi cor_), Il. 24, 521. Here we can say truly that
reason manifests itself practically, and thus wherever action is guided by
reason, where the motives are abstract concepts, wherever we are not
determined by particular ideas of perception, nor by the impression of the
moment which guides the brutes, there _practical reason_ shows itself. But
I have fully explained in the Appendix, and illustrated by examples, that
this is entirely different from and unrelated to the ethical worth of
actions; that rational action and virtuous action are two entirely
different things; that reason may just as well find itself in connection
with great evil as with great good, and by its assistance may give great
power to the one as well as to the other; that it is equally ready and
valuable for the methodical and consistent carrying out of the noble and
of the bad intention, of the wise as of the foolish maxim; which all
results from the constitution of its nature, which is feminine, receptive,
retentive, and not spontaneous; all this I have shown in detail in the
Appendix, and illustrated by examples. What is said there would have been
placed here, but on account of my polemic against Kant’s pretended
practical reason I have been obliged to relegate it to the Appendix, to
which I therefore refer.
The ideal explained in the _Stoical philosophy_ is the most complete
development of _practical reason_ in the true and genuine sense of the
word; it is the highest summit to which man can attain by the mere use of
his reason, and in it his difference from the brutes shows itself most
distinctly. For the ethics of Stoicism are originally and essentially, not
a doctrine of virtue, but merely a guide to a rational life, the end and
aim of which is happiness through peace of mind. Virtuous conduct appears
in it as it were merely by accident, as the means, not as the end.
Therefore the ethical theory of Stoicism is in its whole nature and point
of view fundamentally different from the ethical systems which lay stress
directly upon virtue, such as the doctrines of the Vedas, of Plato, of
Christianity, and of Kant. The aim of Stoical ethics is happiness: τελος
το ευδαι μονειν (_virtutes omnes finem habere beatitudinem_) it is called
in the account of the Stoa by Stobæus (Ecl., L. ii. c. 7, p. 114, and also
p. 138). Yet the ethics of Stoicism teach that happiness can only be
attained with certainty through inward peace and quietness of spirit
(αταραξια), and that this again can only be reached through virtue; this
is the whole meaning of the saying that virtue is the highest good. But if
indeed by degrees the end is lost sight of in the means, and virtue is
inculcated in a way which discloses an interest entirely different from
that of one’s own happiness, for it contradicts this too distinctly; this