In agreement with what we have said, we see the writers who appeared just before Kant place the conscience, as the seat of the moral impulses, in opposition to the reason. Thus Rousseau, in the fourth book of “_Emile_,” says: “_La raison nous trompe, mais la conscience ne trompe jamais_;” and further on: “_Il est impossible d’expliquer par les conséquences de notre nature le principe immédiat de la conscience indépendant de la raison même_.” Still further: “_Mes sentimens naturels parlaient pour l’intérêt commun, ma raison rapportait tout a moi.... On a beau vouloir etablir la vertu __ par la raison seul, quelle solide base peut-on lui donner_?” In the “_Rêveries du Promeneur_,” prom. 4 ême, he says: “_Dans toutes les questions de morale difficiles je me suis tojours bien trouvé de les résoudre par le dictamen de la conscience, plutôt que par les lumières de la raison_.” Indeed Aristotle already says expressly (_Eth. Magna_, i. 5) that the virtues have their seat in the αλογῳ μοριῳ της ψυχης (_in parte irrationali animi_), and not in the λογον εχοντι (_in parte rationali_). In accordance with this, Stobæus says (Ecl., ii, c.7), speaking of the Peripatetics: “Την ηθικην αρετην ὑπολαμβανουσι περι το αλογον μερος γιγνεσθαι της ψυχης, επειδη διμερη προς την παρουσαν θεωριαν ὑπεθεντο την ψυχην, το μεν λογικον εχουσαν, το δ᾽ αλογον. Και περι μεν το λογικον την καλοκαγαθιαν γιγνεσθαν, και την φρονησιν, και την αγχινοιαν, και σοφιαν, και ευμαθειαν, και μνημην, και τας ὁμοιους; περι δε το αλογον, σωφροσυνην, και δικαιοσυνην, και ανδρειαν, και τας αλλας τας ηθικας καλουμενας αρετας.” (_Ethicam virtutem circa partem animæ ratione carentem versari putant, cam duplicem, ad hanc disquisitionem, animam ponant, ratione præditam, et ea carentem. In parte vero ratione prædita collocant ingenuitatem, prudentiam, perspicacitatem, sapientiam, docilitatem, memoriam et reliqua; in parte vero ratione destituta temperantiam, justitiam, fortitadinem, et reliquas virtutes, quas ethicas vocant._) And Cicero (_De Nat. Deor._, iii., c. 26-31) explains at length that reason is the necessary means, the tool, of all crime. I have explained _reason_ to be the _faculty of framing concepts_. It is this quite special class of general non-perceptible ideas, which are symbolised and fixed only by words, that distinguishes man from the brutes and gives him the pre-eminence upon earth. While the brute is the slave of the present, and knows only immediate sensible motives, and therefore when they present themselves to it is necessarily attracted or repelled by them, as iron is by the magnet, in man, on the contrary, deliberation has been introduced through the gift of reason.