The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
rectilineal action of light. On account of the latter circumstance the
impression itself leads directly to the place of the cause, and since the
eye is capable of perceiving with the greatest exactness and at a glance
all the fine distinctions of light and shade, colour and outline, and also
the data in accordance with which the understanding estimates distance, it
thus happens that in the case of impressions of this sense the operation
of the understanding takes place with such rapidity and certainty that we
are just as little conscious of it as of spelling when we read. Hence
arises the delusion that the sensation itself presents us directly with
the objects. Yet it is just in sight that the operation of the
_understanding_, consisting in the knowledge of the cause from the effect,
is most significant. By means of it what is felt doubly, with two eyes, is
perceived as single; by means of it the impression which strikes the
retina upside down, in consequence of the crossing of the rays in the
pupils, is put right by following back the cause of this in the same
direction, or as we express ourselves, we see things upright although
their image in the eye is reversed; and finally by means of the operation
of the understanding magnitude and distance are estimated by us in direct
perception from five different data, which are very clearly and
beautifully described by Dr. Thomas Reid. I expounded all this, and also
the proofs which irrefutably establish the _intellectual nature of
perception_, as long ago as 1816, in my essay “On Sight and Colour”
(second edition, 1854; third edition, 1870), and with important additions
fifteen years later in the revised Latin version of it which is given
under the title, “_Theoria Colorum Physiologica Eademque Primaria_,” in
the third volume of the “_Scriptores Ophthalmologici Minores_,” published
by Justus Radius in 1830; yet most fully and thoroughly in the second (and
third) edition of my essay “On the Principle of Sufficient Reason,” § 21.
Therefore on this important subject I refer to these works, so as not to
extend unduly the present exposition.