The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Burke, in his “Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful,” p. 5, § 4 and 5,
has given a perfectly correct and very elaborate exposition of what I laid
down in § 9 of the first volume, that the words of a speech are perfectly
understood without calling up ideas of perception, pictures in our heads.
But he draws from this the entirely false conclusion that we hear,
apprehend, and make use of words without connecting with them any idea
whatever; whereas he ought to have drawn the conclusion that all ideas are
not perceptible images, but that precisely those ideas which must be
expressed by means of words are abstract notions or conceptions, and these
from their very nature are not perceptible. Just because words impart only
general conceptions, which are perfectly different from ideas of
perception, when, for example, an event is recounted all the hearers will
receive the same conceptions; but if afterwards they wish to make the
incident clear to themselves, each of them will call up in his imagination
a different _image_ of it, which differs considerably from the correct
image that is possessed only by the eye-witness. This is the primary
reason (which, however, is accompanied by others) why every fact is
necessarily distorted by being repeatedly told. The second recounter
communicates conceptions which he has abstracted from the image of _his
own_ imagination, and from these conceptions the third now forms another
image differing still more widely from the truth, and this again he
translates into conceptions, and so the process goes on. Whoever is
sufficiently matter of fact to stick to the conceptions imparted to him,
and repeat them, will prove the most truthful reporter.
The best and most intelligent exposition of the essence and nature of
conceptions which I have been able to find is in Thomas Reid’s “Essays on
the Powers of Human Mind,” vol. ii., Essay 5, ch. 6. This was afterwards
condemned by Dugald Stewart in his “Philosophy of the Human Mind.” Not to
waste paper I will only briefly remark with regard to the latter that he
belongs to that large class who have obtained an undeserved reputation
through favour and friends, and therefore I can only advise that not an
hour should be wasted over the scribbling of this shallow writer.