The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Further, it is sublime, _i.e._, it induces a lofty mood in us, because,
without any relation to us, it moves along for ever strange to earthly
doings, and sees all while it takes part in nothing. Therefore, at the
sight of it the will, with its constant neediness, vanishes from
consciousness, and leaves a purely knowing consciousness behind. Perhaps
there is also mingled here a feeling that we share this sight with
millions, whose individual differences are therein extinguished, so that
in this perception they are one, which certainly increases the impression
of the sublime. Finally, this is also furthered by the fact that the moon
lights without heating, in which certainly lies the reason why it has been
called chaste and identified with Diana. In consequence of this whole
beneficent impression upon our feeling, the moon becomes gradually our
bosom friend. The sun, again, never does so; but is like an over‐plenteous
benefactor whom we can never look in the face.
The following remark may find room here as an addition to what is said in
§ 38 of the first volume on the æsthetic pleasure afforded by light,
reflection, and colours. The whole immediate, thoughtless, but also
unspeakable, pleasure which is excited in us by the impression of colours,
strengthened by the gleam of metal, and still more by transparency, as,
for example, in coloured windows, and in a greater measure by means of the
clouds and their reflection at sunset,—ultimately depends upon the fact
that here in the easiest manner, almost by a physical necessity, our whole
interest is won for knowledge, without any excitement of our will, so that
we enter the state of pure knowing, although for the most part this
consists here in a mere sensation of the affection of the retina, which,
however, as it is in itself perfectly free from pain or pleasure, and
therefore entirely without direct influence on the will, thus belongs to
pure knowledge.
Chapter XXXI.(11) On Genius.