The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
suffit en quelque sorte de pouvoir veiller à leur conservation. Pour cela
l’intelligence était nécessaire, quand la force n’existait pas, et quand
celle‐ci est acquise, toute autre puissance perd de son utilité.__ ›_” And
p. 118: “_La conservation des espèces ne repose pas moins sur les qualités
intellectuelles des animaux, que sur leurs qualités organiques_.” This
last confirms my principle that the intellect, like the claws and teeth,
is nothing else than a weapon in the service of the will.
Chapter XXXII.(14) On Madness.
The health of the mind properly consists in perfect recollection. Of
course this is not to be understood as meaning that our memory preserves
everything. For the past course of our life shrinks up in time, as the
path of the wanderer looking back shrinks up in space: sometimes it is
difficult for us to distinguish the particular years; the days have for
the most part become unrecognisable. Really, however, only the exactly
similar events, recurring an innumerable number of times, so that their
images, as it were, conceal each other, ought so to run together in the
memory that they are individually unrecognisable; on the other hand, every
event in any way peculiar or significant we must be able to find again in
memory, if the intellect is normal, vigorous, and quite healthy. In the
text I have explained _madness_ as the _broken thread_ of this memory,
which still runs on regularly, although in constantly decreasing fulness
and distinctness. The following considerations may serve to confirm this.
The memory of a healthy man affords a certainty as to an event he has
witnessed, which is regarded as just as firm and sure as his present
apprehension of things; therefore, if sworn to by him, this event is
thereby established in a court of law. On the other hand, the mere
suspicion of madness will at once weaken the testimony of a witness. Here,
then, lies the criterion between the healthy mind and insanity. Whenever I
doubt whether an event which I remember really took place, I throw upon
myself the suspicion of madness: unless it is that I am uncertain whether
it was not a mere dream. If another doubts the reality of an event,
related by me as an eye‐witness, without mistrusting my honesty, then he
regards me as insane. Whoever comes at last, through constantly recounting
an event which originally was fabricated by him, to believe in it himself
is, in this one point, really insane. We may ascribe to an insane person
flashes of wit, single clever thoughts, even correct judgments, but his
testimony as to past events no man will consider valid. In the Lalita‐
vistara, well known to be the history of Buddha Sakya‐Muni, it is related
that at the moment of his birth all the sick became well, all the blind
saw, all the deaf heard, and all mad people “recovered their memory.” This
last is mentioned in two passages.(15)