The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
merely from the inadequacy of the individual knowledge of the things, but
not _objective_, _i.e._, a conception in which the things would actually
already be thought together. Even the most general in history is in itself
only a particular and individual, a long period of time, or an important
event; therefore the special is related to this as the part to the whole,
but not as the case to the rule; which, on the contrary, takes place in
all the sciences proper because they afford conceptions and not mere
facts. On this account in these sciences by a correct knowledge of the
general we can determine with certainty the particular that arises. If,
for example, I know the laws of the triangle in general, I can then also
tell what must be the properties of the triangle laid before me; and what
holds good of all mammals, for example, that they have double ventricles
of the heart, exactly seven cervical vertebræ, lungs, diaphragm, bladder,
five senses, &c., I can also assert of the strange bat which has just been
caught, before dissecting it. But not so in history, where the general is
no objective general of the conception, but merely a subjective general of
my knowledge, which can only be called general inasmuch as it is
superficial. Therefore I may always know in general of the Thirty Years’
War that it was a religious war, waged in the seventeenth century; but
this general knowledge does not make me capable of telling anything more
definite about its course. The same opposition is also confirmed by the
fact that in the real sciences the special and individual is that which is
most certain, because it rests upon immediate apprehension; the general
truths, again, are only abstracted from it; therefore something false may
be more easily assumed in the latter. But in history, conversely, the most
general is the most certain; for example, the periods, the succession of
the kings, the revolutions, wars, and treaties of peace; the particulars,
again, of the events and their connection is uncertain, and becomes always
more so the further one goes into details. Therefore history is the more
interesting the more special it is, but the less to be trusted, and
approaches then in every respect to the romance. For the rest, what
importance is to be attached to the boasted pragmatic teaching of history
he will best be able to judge who remembers that sometimes it was only
after twenty years that he understood the events of his own life in their
true connection, although the data for this were fully before him, so
difficult is the combination of the action of the motives under the
constant interferences of chance and the concealment of the intentions.
Since now history really always has for its object only the particular,
the individual fact, and regards this as the exclusively real, it is the
direct opposite and counterpart of philosophy, which considers things from
the most general point of view, and has intentionally the general as its