The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Death is the true inspiring genius, or the muse of philosophy, wherefore
Socrates has defined the latter as θανατου μελετη. Indeed without death
men would scarcely philosophise. Therefore it will be quite in order that
a special consideration of this should have its place here at the
beginning of the last, most serious, and most important of our books.
The brute lives without a proper knowledge of death; therefore the
individual brute enjoys directly the absolute imperishableness of the
species, for it is only conscious of itself as endless. In the case of men
the terrifying certainty of death necessarily entered with reason. But as
everywhere in nature with every evil a means of cure, or at least some
compensation, is given, the same reflection which introduces the knowledge
of death also assists us to _metaphysical_ points of view, which comfort
us concerning it, and of which the brute has no need and is incapable. All
religious and philosophical systems are principally directed to this end,
and are thus primarily the antidote to the certainty of death, which the
reflective reason produces out of its own means. Yet the degree in which
they attain this end is very different, and certainly _one_ religion or
philosophy will, far more than the others, enable men to look death in the
face with a quiet glance. Brahmanism and Buddhism, which teach man to
regard himself as himself, the original being, the Brahm, to which all
coming into being and passing away is essentially foreign, will achieve
much more in this respect than such as teach that man is made out of
nothing, and actually begins at birth his existence derived from another.
Answering to this we find in India a confidence and a contempt for death
of which one has no conception in Europe. It is, in fact, a hazardous
thing to force upon a man, by early imprinting them, weak and untenable
conceptions in this important regard, and thereby making him for ever
incapable of taking up correct and stable ones. For example, to teach him
that he recently came out of nothing, and consequently through an eternity
has been nothing, but yet for the future will be imperishable, is just the
same as to teach him that although he is through and through the work of
another, yet he will be held responsible through all eternity for his
actions. If, then, when the mind ripens and reflection appears, the
untenable nature of such doctrines forces itself upon him, he has nothing
better to put in its place, nay, is no longer capable of understanding
anything better, and thus loses the comfort which nature had destined for
him also, as a compensation for the certainty of death. In consequence of
such a process, we see even now in England (1844), among ruined factory
hands, the Socialists, and in Germany, among ruined students, the young
Hegelians, sink to the absolutely physical point of view, which leads to
the result: _edite_, _bibite_, _post mortem nulla voluptas_, and so far
may be defined as bestialism.