The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
forces of nature an eternity and ubiquity with regard to which the
transitory nature of their fleeting phenomena never makes us err for a
moment. So much the less, then, should it come into our mind to regard the
ceasing of life as the annihilation of the living principle, and
consequently death as the entire destruction of the man. Because the
strong arm which, three thousand years ago, bent the bow of Ulysses is no
more, no reflective and well‐regulated understanding will regard the force
which acted so energetically in it as entirely annihilated, and therefore,
upon further reflection, will also not assume that the force which bends
the bow to‐day first began with this arm. The thought lies far nearer us,
that the force which earlier actuated the life which now has vanished is
the same which is active in the life which now flourishes: nay, this is
almost inevitable. Certainly, however, we know that, as was explained in
the second book, only that is perishable which is involved in the causal
series; but only the states and forms are so involved. On the other hand,
untouched by the change of these which is introduced by causes, there
remain on the one side matter, and on the other side natural forces: for
both are the presupposition of all these changes. But the principle of our
life we must, primarily at least, conceive as a force of nature, until
perhaps a more profound investigation has brought us to know what it is in
itself. Thus, taken simply as a force of nature, the vital force remains
entirely undisturbed by the change of forms and states, which the bond of
cause and effect introduces and carries off again, and which alone are
subject to the process of coming into being and passing away, as it lies
before us in experience. Thus so far the imperishable nature of our true
being can be proved with certainty. But it is true this will not satisfy
the claims which are wont to be made upon proofs of our continued
existence after death, nor insure the consolation which is expected from
such proofs. However, it is always something; and whoever fears death as
an absolute annihilation cannot afford to despise the perfect certainty
that the inmost principle of his life remains untouched by it. Nay, the
paradox might be set up, that that second thing also which, just like the
forces of nature, remains untouched by the continual change under the
guidance of causality, thus matter, by its absolute permanence, insures us
indestructibility, by virtue of which whoever was incapable of
comprehending any other might yet confidently trust in a certain
imperishableness. “What!” it will be said, “the permanence of the mere
dust, of the crude matter, is to be regarded as a continuance of our
being?” Oh! do you know this dust, then? Do you know what it is and what
it can do? Learn to know it before you despise it. This matter which now
lies there as dust and ashes will soon, dissolved in water, form itself as