The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
All philosophers
have erred in this: they place the metaphysical, the indestructible, the
eternal element in man in the _intellect_. It lies exclusively in the
_will_, which is entirely different from the intellect, and alone is
original. The intellect, as was most fully shown in the second book, is a
secondary phenomenon, and conditioned by the brain, therefore beginning
and ending with this. The will alone is that which conditions, the kernel
of the whole phenomenon, consequently free from the forms of the
phenomenon to which time belongs, thus also indestructible. Accordingly
with death consciousness is certainly lost, but not that which produced
and sustained consciousness; life is extinguished, but not the principle
of life also, which manifested itself in it. Therefore a sure feeling
informs every one that there is something in him which is absolutely
imperishable and indestructible. Indeed the freshness and vividness of
memories of the most distant time, of earliest childhood, bears witness to
the fact that something in us does not pass away with time, does not grow
old, but endures unchanged. But what this imperishable element is one
could not make clear to oneself. It is not consciousness any more than it
is the body upon which clearly consciousness depends. But it is just that
which, when it appears in consciousness, presents itself as _will_. Beyond
this immediate manifestation of it we certainly cannot go; because we
cannot go beyond consciousness; therefore the question what that may be
when it does not come within consciousness, _i.e._, what it is absolutely
in itself, remains unanswerable.
In the phenomenon, and by means of its forms, time and space, as
_principium individuationis_, what presents itself is that the human
individual perishes, while the human race, on the contrary, always remains
and lives. But in the true being of things, which is free from these
forms, this whole distinction between the individual and the race also
disappears, and the two are immediately one. The whole will to live is in
the individual, as it is in the race, and therefore the continuance of the
species is merely the image of the indestructibility of the individual.