The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
The terrors of death depend for the most part upon the false illusion that
now the ego vanishes and the world remains. But rather is the opposite the
case; the world vanishes, but the inmost kernel of the ego, the supporter
and producer of that subject, in whose idea alone the world has its
existence, remains. With the brain the intellect perishes, and with the
intellect the objective world, its mere idea. That in other brains,
afterwards as before, a similar world lives and moves is, with reference
to the intellect which perishes, a matter of indifference. If, therefore,
reality proper did not lie in the _will_, and if the moral existence were
not that which extends beyond death, then, since the intellect, and with
it its world, is extinguished, the true nature of things in general would
be no more than an endless succession of short and troubled dreams,
without connection among themselves; for the permanence of unconscious
nature consists merely in the idea of time of conscious nature. Thus a
world‐spirit dreaming without end or aim, dreams which for the most part
are very troubled and heavy, would then be all in all.
When, now, an individual experiences the fear of death, we have really
before us the extraordinary, nay, absurd, spectacle of the lord of the
worlds, who fills all with his being, and through whom alone everything
that is has its existence, desponding and afraid of perishing, of sinking
into the abyss of eternal nothingness;—while, in truth, all is full of
him, and there is no place where he is not, no being in which he does not
live; for it is not existence that supports him, but he that supports
existence. Yet it is he who desponds in the individual who suffers from
the fear of death, for he is exposed to the illusion produced by the
_principium individuationis_ that his existence is limited to the nature
which is now dying. This illusion belongs to the heavy dream into which,
as the will to live, he has fallen. But one might say to the dying
individual: “Thou ceasest to be something which thou hadst done better
never to become.”
So long as no denial of the will takes place, what death leaves untouched
is the germ and kernel of quite another existence, in which a new
individual finds itself again, so fresh and original that it broods over
itself in astonishment. What sleep is for the individual, death is for the
will as thing in itself. It would not endure to continue the same actions
and sufferings throughout an eternity without true gain, if memory and
individuality remained to it. It flings them off, and this is lethe; and
through this sleep of death it reappears refreshed and fitted out with
another intellect, as a new being—“a new day tempts to new shores.”