The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
who, against the advice of her parents, rejects the offer of a rich and
not yet old man, in order, setting aside all considerations of
convenience, to choose according to her instinctive inclination alone,
sacrifices her individual welfare to the species. But just on this account
one cannot withhold from her a certain approbation; for she has preferred
what is of most importance, and has acted in the spirit of nature (more
exactly, of the species), while the parents advised in the spirit of
individual egoism. In accordance with all this, it appears as if in making
a marriage either the individual or the interests of the species must come
off a loser. And this is generally the case; for that convenience and
passionate love should go hand in hand is the rarest of lucky accidents.
The physical, moral, or intellectual deficiency of the nature of most men
may to some extent have its ground in the fact that marriages are
ordinarily entered into not from pure choice and inclination, but from all
kinds of external considerations, and on account of accidental
circumstances. If, however, besides convenience, inclination is also to a
certain extent regarded, this is, as it were, an agreement with the genius
of the species. Happy marriages are well known to be rare; just because it
lies in the nature of marriage that its chief end is not the present but
the coming generation. However, let me add, for the consolation of tender,
loving natures, that sometimes passionate sexual love associates itself
with a feeling of an entirely different origin—real friendship based upon
agreement of disposition, which yet for the most part only appears when
sexual love proper is extinguished in its satisfaction. This friendship
will then generally spring from the fact that the supplementing and
corresponding physical, moral, and intellectual qualities of the two
individuals, from which sexual love arose, with reference to the child to
be produced, are, with reference also to the individuals themselves,
related to each other in a supplementary manner as opposite qualities of
temperament and mental gifts, and thereby form the basis of a harmony of
disposition.
The whole metaphysics of love here dealt with stands in close connection
with my metaphysics in general, and the light which it throws upon this
may be summed up as follows.