But, on the other hand, the three great men of whom we are speaking, since they lived long before the dawn of the Kantian philosophy, are to be pardoned for their distrust of teleology on account of its origin; yet even Voltaire regarded the physico‐theological proof as irrefutable. In order, however, to go into this somewhat more fully: first of all, the polemic of Lucretius (iv. 824‐858) against teleology is so crude and clumsy that it refutes itself and convinces us of the opposite. But as regards Bacon (_De augm. scient._, iii. 4), he makes, in the first place, no distinction with reference to the use of final causes between organised and unorganised nature (which is yet just the principal matter), for, in his examples of final causes, he mixes the two up together. Then he banishes final causes from physics to metaphysics; but the latter is for him, as it is still for many at the present day, identical with speculative theology. From this, then, he regards final causes as inseparable, and goes so far in this respect that he blames Aristotle because he has made great use of final causes, yet without connecting them with speculative theology (which I shall have occasion immediately especially to praise). Finally, Spinoza (_Eth._ i. _prop._ 36, _appendix_) makes it abundantly clear that he identifies teleology so entirely with physico‐theology, against which he expresses himself with bitterness, that he explains _Natura nihil frustra agere_: _hoc est, quod in usum hominum non sit_: similarly, _Omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerant, et credunt aliquem alium esse, qui illa media paraverit_; and also: _Hinc statuerunt, Deos omnia in usum hominum fecisse et dirigere_. Upon this, then, he bases his assertion: _Naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil, nisi humana esse figmenta_. His aim merely was to block the path of theism; and he had quite rightly recognised the physico‐theological proof as its strongest weapon. But it was reserved for Kant really to refute this proof, and for me to give the correct exposition of its material, whereby I have satisfied the maxim: _Est enim verum index sui et falsi_. But Spinoza did not know how else to help himself but by the desperate stroke of denying teleology itself, thus design in the works of nature—an assertion the monstrosity of which is at once evident to every one who has gained any accurate knowledge of organised nature. This limited point of view of Spinoza, together with his complete ignorance of nature, sufficiently prove his entire incompetence in this matter, and the folly of those who, upon his authority, believe they must judge contemptuously of final causes.