The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
But if now, abstracting for a while from this interpretation drawn from
our inner being, we place ourselves as strangers over against nature, in
order to comprehend it objectively, we find that from the grade of
organised life upwards it has only one intention—that of the _maintenance
of the species_. To this end it works, through the immense superfluity of
germs, through the urgent vehemence of the sexual instinct, through its
willingness to adapt itself to all circumstances and opportunities, even
to the production of bastards, and through the instinctive maternal
affection, the strength of which is so great that in many kinds of animals
it even outweighs self‐love, so that the mother sacrifices her life in
order to preserve that of the young. The individual, on the contrary, has
for nature only an indirect value, only so far as it is the means of
maintaining the species. Apart from this its existence is to nature a
matter of indifference; indeed nature even leads it to destruction as soon
as it has ceased to be useful for this end. Why the individual exists
would thus be clear; but why does the species itself exist? That is a
question which nature when considered merely objectively cannot answer.
For in vain do we seek by contemplating her for an end of this restless
striving, this ceaseless pressing into existence, this anxious care for
the maintenance of the species. The strength and time of the individuals
are consumed in the effort to procure sustenance for themselves and their
young, and are only just sufficient, sometimes even not sufficient, for
this. Even if here and there a surplus of strength, and therefore of
comfort—in the case of the _one_ rational species also of
knowledge—remains, this is much too insignificant to pass for the end of
that whole process of nature. The whole thing, when regarded thus purely
objectively, and indeed as extraneous to us, looks as if nature was only
concerned that of all her (Platonic) _Ideas_, _i.e._, permanent forms,
none should be lost. Accordingly, as if she had so thoroughly satisfied
herself with the fortunate discovery and combination of these Ideas (for
which the three preceding occasions on which she stocked the earth’s
surface with animals were only the preparation), that now her only fear is
lest any one of these beautiful fancies should be lost, _i.e._, lest any
one of these forms should disappear from time and the causal series. For
the individuals are fleeting as the water in the brook; the Ideas, on the
contrary, are permanent, like its eddies: but the exhaustion of the water
would also do away with the eddies. We would have to stop at this
unintelligible view if nature were known to us only from without, thus
were given us merely _objectively_, and we accepted it as it is
comprehended by knowledge, and also as sprung from knowledge, _i.e._, in
the sphere of the idea, and were therefore obliged to confine ourselves to
this province in solving it.