Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism — Socrates — John Shaqi
Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
condition of safety--no proposition {166} in Euclid is more certain
than this: but though this be the wisdom of government and of trade,
it is a wisdom which political, commercial, and ecclesiastical
adventurers in all ages have been slow to learn; and in public life we
constantly meet with persons who act and speak as if they believed
that the triumph of an extreme view is ever the triumph of right, and
that the well-being of communities consists in the unlimited sway of
one party and the complete annihilation of all others. And it may be
said also, that, notwithstanding all the warnings of centuries of
bloody experience, the man or the party that takes the strong
one-sided violent view has, on critical occasions, the best chance to
succeed. Wisdom in the days of Solomon lifted up her voice in the
streets, and was not heard. It is even so now. The streets are not the
place for wisdom. Wisdom requires calm reflection; but the streets are
full of hurry and bustle. Aristotle had a serene contempt for the
multitude, and the multitude have an instinctive aversion to
Aristotle. When you bring a multitude of men together to be harangued,
violent and extreme opinions pronounced in the strongest language are
apt to be the most popular. A one-sided view taxes thought less; a
one-sided speech flatters an ignorant audience, who are capable only
of one idea--at least only of one at a time--and who delight to hug
themselves in the fancy that there is no other idea in the universe.
And the natural leader of a multitude so affected is not, of course,
your man of many thoughts, your Aristotle, your Shakespeare, your
Goethe, but your well-packed, self-contained, little man, full of
bottled fire impatient to burst forth, who marches from his cradle to
his grave capable only {167} of one aspect of things, and who, if the
notion by which he is governed happens to jump with the humour of the
time, shall become the demagogue of the hour, or, if circumstances
favour, the dictator of the age. When, indeed, we consider the
undeniable fact that great social changes are generally effected
through the agency of excited multitudes and highly stimulated
parties, we shall not be surprised at the result so often exhibited in
history. That result shows bloody civil wars instead of peaceful
arrangement; faction instead of patriotism; and an oscillation between
feverish extremes, instead of a well-calculated balance of social
forces. The revolutions and reforms which fill the most interesting
pages of history teem with examples of this kind. These revolutions
and reforms are of two kinds--remedial and constructive, or
disintegrating and destructive; and the history of both equally
illustrates the hopelessness--perhaps it were more correct to say the
impossibility--of expecting wisdom and moderation to perform a
prominent part in the management of the congregated millions of
diverse and hostile-minded men under the passionate influences that
accompany organic change.