Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
much elevated by their presence, nor much depressed by their absence.
For not even the absence of that honour, which he justly claims, will
he allow to affect his peace very deeply, much less the withholding of
that wealth and that influence, which are desired by the good only for
the sake of the honour which they bring with them. He therefore who
can look calmly on the absence of that which is most desired, will not
break his heart because he finds himself destitute of those things
which are valued only as they contribute to the attainment of that
desire. For this reason it is that men of a high self-esteem are apt
to appear proud and contemptuous. It would appear also that the
accidents of birth and fortune contribute in some degree towards
great-mindedness; for persons of noble birth are considered worthy of
honour, and persons of great influence, and wealthy persons; and there
is a superiority belonging to all such persons, which brings a certain
amount of honour along with it that is grateful to a good man. And it
cannot be denied that such things have a tendency to engender a
certain loftiness of soul, for they are never without honour from some
quarter. Nevertheless the only thing really deserving of honour is
virtue, though where virtue is conjoined with these external
advantages it will always command a latter share of public respect.
But those who possess such external advantages without virtue have
neither any reason for thinking themselves deserving of great
consideration, nor are they properly called great-minded; for it is
only of those who possess virtue that such things can be predicated.
On the contrary, those who possess such external goods are apt to
{177} become insolent and haughty. For without virtue it is by no
means easy to bear prosperity well; and, not bearing it well, such
persons are apt to conceit themselves better than their neighbours,
and to despise them, while themselves spend their lives at random, and
do what chance throws in their way. For they imitate the manner of the
great-minded man, not being like him in soul; and, while they do
nothing on which a lofty estimate of themselves might justly be
founded, they find it easy to usurp an apparent superiority by looking
down upon their fellow-men. This superiority belongs of right to the
great-minded man, for his opinion of himself is founded on reality;
but these, as chance may have thrown some exceptional tag of
distinction in their way, despise their neighbours. Again, the
great-minded man is not fond of running petty risks, nor indeed is it
by rash and hasty ventures in any shape that he would catch a small
breath of honour; but when a great risk presents itself then he
willingly confronts danger, and spares not his life, as deeming life
secondary when higher interests are concerned. Moreover, in reference
to benefits, he is more given to confer than to receive them; for he
who confers a benefit always stands in a position of superiority,