Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism — Socrates — John Shaqi
Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
though they of course are poor philosophers and ignoble men who think
that virtue could not possibly exist in the world without the belief
in immortality. There are many motives that force the masses of men to
be virtuous, according to the respectable righteousness of the Scribes
and Pharisees, altogether independent of any prospect of rewards and
punishments in a future state; and as for men of a more than commonly
delicate moral sensibility--persons to whom a life in baseness and
foulness would under any conditions be intolerable--it is not to be
imagined that they would be more virtuous from the prospect of an
eternity of bliss, than they are from the fear of a short season of
shame. These men will always live nobly, for the same reason that
whatever they do they must do well. If they play cricket, they will
play a good game; if they ride, they will ride well; and if they boat,
they will boat well; and, for the same reason, if they live, they will
live well--not because they expect a reward, but because they have no
pleasure in living badly. To them vice is always rottenness,
putrescence, and loathsomeness; and no man will consciously condemn
himself to these who knows what soundness means.
There is one marked peculiarity about Christian Ethics, growing
directly out of a religious root, and closely connected with certain
theological doctrines, which, though indicated in some of the previous
paragraphs, demands special mention here. We mean what Dr. Chalmers
called its aggressive attitude. The idea of Duty is not necessarily
aggressive; a man may perform his duty quietly, as the spheres {210}
move in their orbits, without daring, or even desiring, to meddle with
the movements of other members of the great social machine. Even
Christian Churches in quiet and flat times, as the last century for
instance, have been known to content themselves with the unobtrusive
performance of a certain round of familiar pieties, undisturbed by any
desire to make moral inroads into the domain of remote or even
adjacent heathenism. But this is certainly not the normal or
flourishing state of any Christian Church; not the natural state
indeed of any sect or society, whether religious or philosophical,
professing to possess a healing medicine for the cure of diseased
souls. We accordingly found in the first discourse that Socrates was
in his attitude, however pleasant and playful on the surface, at
bottom very earnestly aggressive; it was this aggressiveness, in fact,
that raised up against him the hostility of those spiteful little
individuals to whom more than to popular ill-will he owed his
martyr-death. He asserted, as we have seen, a divine mission, and
acted as a missionary, though always in the manner of a reasoner
rather than as a preacher. But the aggressive element in early
Christianity was much stronger than in Socrates; as any one may see at
a glance by comparing the biographical career of St. Paul with that of
the Athenian philosopher.