Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
One of the most interesting of the contrasts generally drawn between
Christian and heathen ethics, is that which concerns the very
difficult virtue of SELF-ESTIMATE. “Let every man,” says St.
Paul, {230} “strive not to think of himself beyond what he ought to
think, but soberly, according as God has divided to every man the
measure of faith.” And accordingly we find that in the lives of
eminent Christians, as well as in formal treatises on Christian
ethics, humility has always had a prominent place assigned to it in
the roll of the virtues. But here again we must beware of running into
a vulgar extreme, by imagining that the Greeks and Romans knew nothing
of this virtue, and that they systematically fostered pride and
self-importance. It is no doubt true, as every schoolboy knows, that
the word ταπεινός, which in classical Greek signifies _mean_
and _paltry_, in New Testament Greek is used to designate that sort of
person who thinks of himself modestly, or, as St. Paul in the verse
quoted says, “soberly;” but the mere change in the shade of colour
belonging to certain words when passing from Attic into Alexandrian
Greek, proves nothing in such a case; and if the matter is to be
settled by words, the phrase σωφρονεῖν used by St. Paul, taking the
place of the ταπεινοφροσύνη of other passages, is the very word by
which the Greek moralists constantly express that golden mean between
a high and a low estimate of self, which Aristotle their spokesman
lauds as the habitual tone of the perfectly virtuous man. So far
indeed was the Hellenic mind from recognising no sin in pride, that it
looked upon self-exaltation and ramping self-assertion in every form
as not only a great sin, but the mother of all sins. This sin they
designated by the significant term ὕβρις--a word which etymologically
signifies _beyond the mark_, and which, if it had not already existed,
might well have been coined by {231} Aristotle, had he been given,
like Bentham, to the pedantry of making a language for himself.
“Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.”