Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism — Socrates — John Shaqi
Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
It will be most convenient to treat this subject historically, because
this method will display in the clearest light the operation of that
one-sided reaction out of which the Lockian philosophy, no less than
the Benthamite Ethics took its rise. And here it will be manifest that
we cannot altogether escape metaphysics, however odious that word may
sound to the general English ear; for in our inquiry we must find or
assert certain first principles which form the foundation of all
reason, whether practical or speculative; and though metaphysics, like
clouds, are apt to be misty, they are just as certainly the {272}
fountain of all moral science, as the clouds are the fathers of the
rain, which supplies the water that moves the useful machinery of the
mill. We must therefore start from Mr. Locke, the acknowledged father
of whatever school of British thinking deserves the name of a
philosophy. No doubt before him came Hobbes; but this man stands
alone, like a huge trap-rock bolt up in a flat country; and therefore
we shall let him lie over for a separate treatment, if opportunity
should occur; but in tracing up the main line of Utilitarian Ethics
from Mill to Hartley, I found that they ended naturally and
legitimately in Locke, just as a net-work of waters may often be
traced to one common well-head. Now Locke is the father of what the
Germans call the empirical philosophy. What does this mean? It simply
means, as any one may see by a superficial glance cast on the first
chapter of the “Essay on the Human Understanding,” that he
commenced his philosophy by a formal declaration of war against the
doctrine of INNATE IDEAS inherited by modern thinkers from the
Platonists of Athens, Alexandria, and Florence; and, if all innate
sources of true knowledge are denied, then there remains for morality,
as for everything else, only the source of external experience, which
comes to us not by nature but by acquisition; for according to the use
of the English language, whatever things a man does not originally
possess, he acquires. Locke, therefore, in the language of Plato and
Aristotle, denied the existence of ἐπιστήμη, or science properly so
called, which is founded on necessary principles of internal reason,
and asserted that all knowledge is to be got by ἐμπειρία or
experience, in other words, is what the {273} Germans call empirical.
That Locke’s ideas on this fundamental question of all speculation
were anything but clear we shall see immediately; but on the face of
the matter the very noticeable thing is, that in rejecting the
doctrine of innate ideas the Englishman does not go directly to Plato
and Plotinus, the sources from which this doctrine had come, but he
goes to war with certain floating loose notions of Herbert and other
dreamy speculators of his own or the previous generation. Now, this is
evidently a method of proceeding altogether unphilosophical. If a man
means to refute Christianity scientifically, he does not go to the