Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism — Socrates — John Shaqi
Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
all things he hated, and was constantly denouncing and exposing, that
meretricious and essentially hollow oratory which the man of the
people always must practise when the electors, on whose favour he is
dependent, have their opinions dictated by local interests and
personal passions, rather than by large considerations of public right
and the general good. Lastly, as a moralist, he knew that there is no
bait more seductive to the human mind than the love of power; to this
strong passion democracy applies a constant and potent stimulus; and
thus acts directly in bringing the worst and not the best men into
situations of public influence and trust; for good men are modest, and
more apt to feel the responsibilities than to covet the advantages of
political power. Thus far Socrates was decidedly, if not
anti-republican, at least anti-democratic; but we must bear in mind
also that he and, we may add, all the wise Greeks were equally or even
more opposed to the cold selfishness of a narrow oligarchy governing
for their own aggrandizement; and that, like every man with Hellenic
blood in his veins, he had an instinctive hatred of {103} tyranny and
oppression in every shape; and proved this, as Xenophon informs us, in
the most decided way, by publicly bearding two of the thirty tyrants,
and pursuing quietly his labours of love in their despite.
The prosecution and death of Socrates, which we must now sketch, is
one of the most interesting events in history,--useful also in a
special degree as a warning to that large class of persons who are
inclined to follow the multitude in all things, with unlimited faith
in the motto VOX POPULI VOX DEI. Never did a people, in this case a
particularly shrewd and intelligent people, cased in the hard panoply
of unreasoned tradition, under the distorting influence of prejudice,
the exaggerations of personal spite, and the smooth seductions of
popular oratory, commit an act of more daring defiance to every
principle of truth and justice. Happily we possess evidence of the
most distinct and indubitable description with regard both to the
nature of the charges brought against the philosopher and the
delusions which blinded his judges. In reference to the first point,
we have the very words of the indictment, given in the same terms by
both Plato and Xenophon. With regard to the second point, wherein the
real key to his condemnation lies, we have an ancient comedy--the
Clouds of Aristophanes--in which the state of public feeling and
popular prejudice in Athens in reference to the philosopher is brought
as vividly before us as if it had been a matter of yesterday. In this
play--one of the wisest certainly, and one of the most humorous, that
ever was written--Socrates is put forward as representing the
Sophists; and a picture is drawn of that class of persons, calculated
to stir up a whole host {104} of indignant feelings, patriotic and
personal, against the philosopher. No doubt the whole affair, so far