Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
We now proceed to place before the reader a short statement of the
most striking characteristics of the ethical philosophy of Aristotle
as they are set forth in that compact little book, the _Nicomachean
Ethics_. And the first observation proper to make here is the extreme
practicality that appears not more in the general colour and tone than
in the individual chapters and paragraphs of this remarkable volume.
In criticising the sermons delivered in our Christian pulpits we are
accustomed to distinguish between doctrinal and practical preaching,
and to believe that while, in Scotland at least, the former is the
more popular and the more easy, the latter is always the more
difficult and the more efficient style of moral address. Now what we
have to say of Aristotle, as he appears in the _Ethics_, is that he is
not a mere {142} writer on ethics, an acute speculator or a subtle
casuist, but he presents himself with all the seriousness of a
preacher, and an eminently practical preacher. No doubt in this
capacity he must be regarded both by natural genius and in the general
tone of his ethical writings as second to his great master Plato; but
his influence on the moral culture of the world has not for that
reason been less. A large class of men, especially in this practical
country, are apt to suspect Plato of nonsense; and these are unwilling
to take advice in the affairs of common life from a man who, in his
flights of ideal constructiveness, so far transcends the narrow range
of their own hard-faced realism. But Aristotle is a man whom no man
can suspect of nonsense. He takes what lies before him, and in the
most cool practical way conceivable proceeds to analyse it, and to
spell out its significance. He is not ambitious--at least not in the
department of morals--of piling a grand system, or of tabulating an
exhaustive scheme. He is a practical man, as much as you or I am, and
sees with marked distinctness always what lies in his way. There is no
fear that under his guidance you will lose yourself in a mist or be
carried off your feet in a balloon. He is therefore peculiarly fitted
for being put forward as a lay-preacher to a British public; and the
Oxford scholars have done good service to the English youth by giving
his famous work on Ethics such a prominent place among classical books
of the first rank. He is as sensible as Dr. Paley, and a great deal
more profound; while, on the other hand, it never occurs to him that
it is necessary to prepare the way for a plain practical discourse on
the conduct of life by abstract discussions {143} on the liberty of
the will and the responsibility of free agents. This omission
Principal Grant considers a weakness; I consider it a sign of good
sense, or, at all events, a remarkable piece of good luck. He assumes
morality in the moral world, just as he assumes light and air and
water in the physical; he describes a moral man with strong lines and