The Philosophy of Spinoza — Baruch Spinoza — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Spinoza
Baruch Spinoza · en
The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both
of external bodies and of the human body itself and must involve the
nature not only of the human body, but of its parts, for the
modifications are ways in which the parts of the human body, and
consequently the whole body, are affected. But an adequate knowledge of
external bodies and of the parts composing the human body does not exist
in God in so far as He is considered as affected by the human mind, but
in so far as He is affected by other ideas. These ideas of
modifications, therefore, in so far as they are related to the human
mind alone, are like conclusions without premises, that is to say, as is
self-evident, they are confused ideas.
The idea which forms the nature of the mind is demonstrated in the same
way not to be clear and distinct when considered in itself. So also with
the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
modifications of the human body, in so far as they are related to the
mind alone, as every one may easily see.
All ideas are in God and in so far as they are related to God are true
and adequate. No ideas, therefore, are inadequate or confused unless in
so far as they are related to the individual mind of some person. All
ideas, therefore, both adequate and inadequate, follow by the same
necessity.
_The Origin and Nature of Adequate Ideas_
Let there be something, _A_, which is common to all bodies, and which is
equally in the part of each body and in the whole. I say that _A_ can
only be adequately conceived. For the idea of _A_ will necessarily be
adequate in God, both in so far as He has the idea of the human body and
in so far as He has the idea of its modifications, which involve the
nature of the human body, and partly also the nature of external bodies;
that is to say, this idea will necessarily be adequate in God in so far
as He constitutes the human mind, or in so far as He has ideas which are
in the human mind. The mind, therefore, necessarily perceives _A_
adequately, both in so far as it perceives itself or its own or any
external body; nor can _A_ be conceived in any other manner.
Hence it follows that some ideas or notions exist which are common to
all men, for all bodies agree in some things, which must be adequately,
that is to say, clearly and distinctly, perceived by all.
Hence it follows also that the more things the body has in common with
other bodies, the more things will the mind be adapted to perceive.
Those ideas are also adequate which follow in the mind from ideas which
are adequate in it. For when we say that an idea follows in the human
mind from ideas which are adequate in it, we do but say that in the
divine intellect itself an idea exists of which God is the cause, not in
so far as He is infinite, nor in so far as He is affected by the ideas
of a multitude of individual things, but in so far only as He
constitutes the essence of the human mind.