A Philosophical Dictionary, Volume 08 — Voltaire — John Shaqi
A Philosophical Dictionary, Volume 08
Voltaire · en
Secondly, is he not much more honored upon my hypothesis, which
maintains that he does everything by the necessity of his own nature,
than upon yours, which raises up against him an enemy, disfiguring,
polluting, and destroying all his works of wisdom and kindness
throughout the world!
In the third place, it by no means implies a mean and unworthy idea of
God to say that, after forming millions of worlds, in which death and
evil may have no residence, it might be necessary that death and evil
should reside in this.
Fourth, it is not deprecating God to say that He could not form man
without bestowing on him self-love; that this self-love could not be his
guide without almost always leading him astray; that his passions are
necessary, but at the same time noxious; that the continuation of the
species cannot be accomplished without desires; that these desires
cannot operate without exciting quarrels; and that these quarrels
necessarily bring on wars, etc.
Fifth, on observing a part of the combinations of the vegetable, animal,
and mineral kingdoms, and the porous nature of the earth, in every part
so minutely pierced and drilled like a sieve, and from which exhalations
constantly rise in immense profusion, what philosopher will be bold
enough, what schoolman will be weak enough, decidedly to maintain that
nature could possibly prevent the ravages of volcanoes, the
intemperature of seasons, the rage of tempests, the poison of
pestilence, or, in short, any of those scourages which afflict the
world?
Sixth, a very great degree of power and skill are required to form lions
who devour bulls, and to produce men who invent arms which destroy, by a
single blow, not merely the life of bulls and lions, but--melancholy as
the idea is--the life of one another. Great power is necessary to
produce the spiders which spread their exquisitely fine threads and
net-work to catch flies; but this power amounts not to omnipotence--it
is not boundless power.
In the seventh place, if the Supreme Being had been infinitely powerful,
no reason can be assigned why He should not have made creatures endowed
with sensation infinitely happy; He has not in fact done so; therefore
we ought to conclude that He could not do so.
Eighth, all the different sects of philosophers have struck on the rock
of physical and moral evil. The only conclusion that can be securely
reached is, that God, acting always for the best, has done the best that
He was able to do.
Ninth, this necessity cuts off all difficulties and terminates all
disputes. We have not the hardihood to say: "All is good"; we say:
"There is no more evil than was absolutely inevitable."