I. There is something supposed, namely, that our first parents were endued with a freedom of will. This is a property belonging to man, as a reasonable creature; so that we may as well separate understanding from the mind, as liberty from the will, especially when it is conversant about things within its own sphere, and, most of all, when we consider man in a state of perfection, as to all the powers and faculties of his soul, as he was before the fall. Now, that we may understand what this freedom of will was, let it be considered, that it consisted in a power, which man had, of choosing, or embracing, what appeared, agreeably to the dictates of his understanding, to be good, or refusing and avoiding what was evil, and that without any constraint or force, laid upon him, to act contrary to the dictates thereof; and it also supposes a power to act pursuant to what the will chooses, otherwise it could not secure the happiness that it desires, or avoid the evil that it detests, and then its liberty would be little more than a name, without the thing contained in it. Moreover, since the thing that the will chooses, is supposed to be agreeable to the dictates of the understanding, it follows, that if there be an error in judgment, or a destructive, or unlawful object presents itself, under the notion of good, though it be really evil, the will is, notwithstanding, said to act freely, in choosing or embracing it, in which respect it is free to evil, as well as to good. To apply this to our present purpose, we must suppose man, in his state of innocency, to have been without any defect in his understanding, and therefore that he could not, when making a right use of the powers and faculties of his soul, call evil good, or good evil. Nevertheless, through inadvertency, the mind might be imposed on, and that which was evil might be represented under the appearance of good, and accordingly the will determine itself to choose or embrace it; for this is not inconsistent with liberty, since it might have been avoided by the right improvement of his natural powers, and therefore he was not constrained or forced to sin. Now it appears, that our first parents had this freedom of will, or power to retain their integrity, from their being under an indispensible obligation to yield perfect obedience, and liable to punishment for the least defect thereof. This therefore, supposes the thing not to be in itself impossible, or the punishment ensuing unavoidable. Therefore it follows, that they had a power to stand; or, which is all one, a liberty of will, to choose that which was conducive to their happiness.