But since that which bears the greatest share in this work, according to them, is the will and power of man, determining itself, by proper motives and arguments, to what is good; which supposes, that it acts freely therein. This may give us occasion to consider the nature of human liberty; we do not deny, in general, that man is endowed with a free will, which exerts itself in things of a lower nature, to that which we are speaking of, for this is as evident, as that he is endowed with an understanding: we shall therefore, in speaking concerning the liberty of the will of man, (1.) Consider what are the essential properties of liberty,[8] without which, an action would cease to be free. And, (2.) How far the power of man’s free-will may be extended, with a particular view to the matter, under our present consideration. 1. Concerning the nature and essential properties of human liberty. They, whose sentiments of free-will and grace we are opposing, suppose that it is essential to a free action, or otherwise it could not be denominated free, that it be performed with indifferency, that is, that the will of man should be so equally poised, that as it determines itself to one extreme, it might as well have determined itself to the other: therefore, he that loves God freely, might, by a determination of his will, as well have inclined himself to hate him; and on the other hand, he that hates God, might, by an act of his will, have determined himself to love him: the balance is supposed to be equal, and it is the method that the person uses to determine his will, that gives a turn to it. And from hence they infer, that they who persevere in grace, which they do freely, may, for the same reason, apostatize; yea, they proceed farther, at least some of them, who have maintained, that our Saviour might have sinned, and consequently the work of our redemption have miscarried in his hands; because, according to this notion of liberty, he acted freely in all those exercises of grace; which, we suppose, were no less free, because they were necessary; and also, from this account they give of liberty, they infer that the angels and glorified saints might sin, and so lose that state of blessedness, which they are possessed of; otherwise their obedience is not free; which absurdities are so apparently gross, that they who duly weigh them, will not easily give into this notion of liberty. And there is another absurdity, which the Pelagians dare not assert; for it would be the greatest blasphemy that could be contained in words, though it equally flows from this method of explaining the nature of liberty; that either God must not act freely, or else he might act the contrary, with respect to those things in which he acts, like himself, as a God of infinite perfection; and accordingly, if he loves or delights in himself freely, or designs his own glory, as the highest end of all that he does, and uses means to