A Body of Divinity, Vol. 3 (of 4): Wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are explained and defended, being the substance of several lectures on the Assembly's Larger CatechismRidgley, Thomas
Religion
A Body of Divinity, Vol. 3 (of 4): Wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are explained and defended, being the substance of several lectures on the Assembly's Larger Catechism
bring about those ends which are most conducive thereunto; wherein his
holiness, wisdom, justice, and faithfulness appear, I say, it will
follow from their scheme, and I cannot but tremble to mention it, that
he might do the contrary; and what is this but to say, that he might
cease to be God.
The arguments which they who attempt to support this notion of liberty,
insist on, are taken from the ideas which we generally have of a
person’s acting freely; as for instance, if a man performs any of the
common actions of life, such as walking, sitting, standing, reading,
writing, &c. freely, he may do the contrary.
But to this I answer, That there is a vast difference between asserting,
that many of the actions of life are arbitrary or indifferent, so that
we might do the contrary; and saying that indifferency is essential to
liberty; for that which is essential to an action must belong to every
individual action of the same kind.[9] Thus concerning their notion of
liberty, whom we oppose.
But on the other hand, that which we acquiesce in, is, that its
essential property or nature, consists in a person’s doing a thing
without being laid under a natural necessity to do it;[10] or doing it
of his own accord, without any force laid on him.[11] Others express it
by a person’s doing a thing out of choice, as having the highest reason
to determine him so to do.[12] This is that notion of liberty which we
cannot but approve of; and we are now to shew,
(2.) How far the power of man’s free-will may be extended, with a
particular view to the matter under our present consideration. Here let
it be observed,
_1st_, That the power of man’s will extends itself to things, within its
own sphere, and not above it; all actions and powers of acting, are
contained within certain limits, agreeable to the nature and capacity of
the agent. Creatures below man, cannot put forth rational actions: and
man cannot put forth supernatural actions, if he be not made partaker of
a divine or spiritual nature, as being endowed with a supernatural
principle, such as that which is implanted in regeneration. Consider him
as an intelligent creature, and it is agreeable to his nature to put
forth free actions, under the conduct and direction of the
understanding; but if we consider him as renewed, converted, or
effectually called, and acting agreeably thereunto, then he is under the
influence of an higher principle, which I call a _divine nature_,
according to the phrase which the apostle uses, 2 Pet. i. 4. The former
of these supposes no more than the concourse of common providence, which
at first gave, and then maintains our reasoning faculties; whereas the
latter supposes, that we are under the influence of the Spirit; whereby
we are enabled to act in a supernatural way, our natures being renewed
and disposed thereunto, in which we are not divested of the liberty of
our wills; but they are improved and enabled, to do what before they
were averse and disinclined to.
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