The People's Obedience must be _plain_, and without _Evasions_. The Prince's Prerogative should be so too. King _Charles the First_ made this Answer to the Petition of Right, (to the Observation whereof he held himself obliged in Conscience, as well as of his Prerogative.) "That the People's Liberties strengthen the King's Prerogative, and the King's Prerogative is to defend the People's Liberties." That Prince's Declarations allow the Original of Government to come from the People. Prerogative never yet pretended to repealing. The first ground of Prerogative was to enable the Prince to do _good_, not to do _every thing_. If the ground of a King's desire of Power be his assurance of himself that he will do no hurt by it; is it not an Argument for Subjects to desire to _keep_ that which they will never _abuse_? It must not be such a Prerogative as giveth the Government the Rickets; all the Nourishment to go to the upper part, and the lower starved. As a Prince is in danger who calleth a stronger than himself to his Assistance; so when Prerogative useth _Necessity_ for an Argument, it calleth in a stronger thing than itself. The same Reason may overturn it. Necessity too is so plain a thing, that every body sees it, so that the Magistrate hath no great privilege in being the Judge of it. Necessity therefore is a dangerous Argument for Princes, since (wherever it is real) it constitutes every Man a Magistrate, and gives as great a Power of dispensing to every private Man, as a Prince can claim. It is not so proper to say that _Prerogative_ justifieth _Force_, as that _Force_ supporteth _Prerogative_. They have not been such constant Friends, but that they have had terrible _Fallings_ out. All Powers are of God; and between _Permission_ and _Appointment_, well considered, there is no real difference. In a limited Monarchy, Prerogative and Liberty are as jealous of one another as any two neighbouring States can be of their respective Incroachments. They ought not to part for small Bickerings, and must bear little Jealousies without breaking for them. Power is so apt to be insolent, and Liberty to be saucy, that they are very seldom upon good Terms. They are both so quarrelsome that they will not easily enter into a fair Treaty. For indeed it is hard to bring them together; they ever quarrel at a distance. Power and Liberty are respectively managed in the World in a manner not suitable to their Value and Dignity. They are both so abused that it justifieth the Satires that are generally made upon them. And They are so in Possession of being misapplied, that instead of censuring their being abused, it is more reasonable to wonder whenever they are _not_ so. They are perpetually wrestling, and have had their Turns when they have been thrown, to have their Bones broken by it. If they were not both apt to be out of Breath, there would be no living. If Prerogative will urge Reason to support it, it must bear Reason when it resisteth it.