A Class Room Logic: Deductive and Inductive, with Special Application to the Science and Art of TeachingMcNair, George Hastings
Philosophy
A Class Room Logic: Deductive and Inductive, with Special Application to the Science and Art of Teaching
McNair, George Hastings
Logic
A sensation is the first and A sensation is a vague,
simplest mental result of the unlocalized mental product of
stimulation of an incarrying the knowing mind.
nerve.
A percept is a mental A percept is a consciously
product which results from a localized group of sensations.
consciousness of particular
material things present to the
sense.
An image is a mental product An image is a reproduced
which results from particular percept.
material things not present to
the sense.
A concept is a representation A concept is a mental product
in our minds answering to a arising from thinking many
general name. notions into one class.
A judgment is the result of A judgment is the mental
asserting an agreement or product arising from conjoining
disagreement between two ideas. or disjoining notions.
An inference is a judgment An inference is a judgment
derived from perceiving derived from antecedent
relations between other judgments.
judgments.
It is seen that the sensations furnish the raw material. Ignoring the
few exceptions we may then say that a percept is a made-over group of
sensations; a concept a thought-made group of percepts; a judgment a
thought-made group of concepts; an inference a judgment derived from
other judgments.
_Developed thinking_ is first found in the concept, and as we study the
thought products, “concept,” “judgment” and “inference,” the truth is
forced upon us that _thinking as a process aims to group the many into
one_. From many percepts is built the one concept, from two concepts
is built the one judgment and from two judgments is built the one
inference.[3]
Speaking figuratively, thinking is a matter of picking up the fragments
along the shore of consciousness and tying them into bundles.
=7. THOUGHT IN THE SENSATION AND PERCEPT.=
So far in this discussion it has been assumed that there is
no thinking involved in the sensation or the percept. There
are good authorities, however, who insist on dignifying the
sensation, even with a crude form of thinking. To illustrate:
One may be reading an interesting novel. The mind is being
entertained and ignores the activities of the objective world,
yet we cannot say that the mind is dead to the world outside.
There is a dim consciousness of certain noises without. These
unlocalized sounds are sensations; but how is the mind able to
recognize them as sounds or noises? To interpret the noises is
it not necessary for the mind to affirm a connection between
them and some past mental experience? Is it possible for
the mind to know anything without establishing some kind
of connection between the outside occurrence and an inner
situation? If this is granted then in sensation there must be
implicit thinking.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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