The great objection to the patriotism of habituation is that it cannot criticize itself. The lack of criticism will, of course, make for overwhelming strength. In commenting upon the patriotism of the present time, Russell has written as follows: “This instinct [patriotism], just because, in its intense form, it was new and unfamiliar, had remained uninfected by thought, not paralyzed or devitalized by doubt and cold detachment.”[64] But it is just an accident if such patriotism is good. It may easily be the patriotism of the man who takes the stand, “My country, right or wrong,” a position which, while there is something to be said for it on the ground that countries are fundamental institutions which must not be lightly abandoned to destruction, is hardly one to be striven for as an ethical ideal. The road to goodness is not by chance, but by intelligent self-direction. And the goodness of patriotism rests upon the use of intelligence. Patriotism could not as matters now stand be done away with by criticism, but its nature could be molded. We could habituate ourselves to admire and serve in our life what really was to be admired and served. But the process of habituation, while it produces a powerful spirit of group loyalty, can hardly give a full account of the rise of a conscious ideal like patriotism. The question would remain, “Why the habituation, and why so much insistence upon it?” The process implies a reason for its existence. And reasons become effective through the action of an intelligent agent. The objection to a theory like that of Sumner is that by it social activity is looked at too exclusively on the outside when it ought also to be looked at on the inside. The theory does not do justice to the initiative of the mind. The mores for the most part seem almost to be active entities, which, starting from environmental conditions, develop themselves. Minds are held in their grip. But mores are products of human activity and reflection, and if one would understand them, he must understand the mind, with not only its impulses, but also its ways of thought. Sumner’s own work shows that he believes in something beyond the mores, and that he has an ideal of acting above them. His confidence is placed in thought. He believes that he at least can reflect upon the group ways, and that a science, or perhaps even a philosophy, of the mores can be established. The following are his own words: “Since it appears that the old mores are mischievous if they last beyond the duration of the conditions and needs to which they are adapted, and that constant, gradual, smooth, and easy readjustment is the course of things which is conducive to healthful life, it follows that _free and rational criticism_ of traditional mores is essential to societal welfare.”[65] Human beings are moved not only by instincts and habits, but also by reasons. And it is with the reasoned beliefs of patriotism that the following part will deal. PART III