A Diplomat's Memoir of 1870: being the account of a balloon escape from the siege of Paris and a political mission to London and ViennaReitlinger, Frederic
History
A Diplomat's Memoir of 1870: being the account of a balloon escape from the siege of Paris and a political mission to London and Vienna
Reitlinger, Frederic
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871 -- Diplomatic history
I have purposely said that Austria was not in a condition to, that
she _could_ not intervene effectively, because this was the truth and
because if I said that she _would_ not do so, it would perhaps be doing
her an injustice. It was not the goodwill that was lacking, but the
power.
That was exactly the great misfortune of our situation; not a single
power in Europe was prepared for any kind of action: none was in a
position for action.
In 1870 Europe was not expecting war. Among all the living and active
nations, from the Ocean to the Ural Mountains, from the Mediterranean
to the North Pole, only one Power was on the watch and getting ready.
Only one Power was prepared at the moment of shock, and that Power was
exactly the one which France, herself unready, had chosen for an enemy.
Outside Prussia no one in Europe had foreseen war, and no one was armed
or in condition for a campaign.
The declaration of war in 1870 had burst unexpectedly in the midst of
peaceable Europe like a thunder-clap which shakes the earth in the
middle of a calm spring day.
All the Powers of Europe were enjoying a complete rest. Their armies
scarcely existed, their soldiers were on furlough and working quietly
in fields and workshops. Contingents had been reduced. All lived in
peace and security. Prussia herself had diminished her standing army,
and it was only due to her prodigious military organisation that she
was able to assemble her forces with hitherto unknown rapidity.
So France was alone in presence of her enemy. She was isolated in
Europe, not only from the diplomatic but also from the military point
of view. When the combat turned into defeat for the armies which
Europe had always regarded as legions of victory, panic seized the
minds of all. Europe, which had not armed _before_ the declaration of
war, because there was no cloud on the political horizon to menace
general peace, now, after the sanguinary battles and great successes
of Prussia, did not dare to arm, because she did not want to provoke
France’s conqueror, now become the all-powerful arbiter of Europe.
How often during this painful journey did I not hear the characteristic
remark: “We cannot mobilize a single soldier without exposing
ourselves....” The _quos ego_ of the conqueror paralysed Europe.
Austria was no better prepared than other nations. Consequently she was
not in a condition to intervene in the conflict more effectively than
by diplomatic intervention. And diplomatic intervention was bound to be
useless, since Prussia had formally declared that she would not accept
the mediation of any Power, and that she would deal direct with France
for the conclusion of peace.
I was excellently received by M. le Comte de Beust. He welcomed me
frankly and cordially, and did not attempt to conceal his views. His
first words convinced me that I was speaking to a sincere friend of
France--but to an impotent friend.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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