The interview, therefore, which lasted more than an hour, resembled a familiar conversation rather than a diplomatic conference, and I shall never forget the eagerness and, shall we say, the “_laisser aller_” of the Imperial Chancellor, who seemed to seize with pleasure an opportunity which allowed him to say what he thought of the war, of the Imperial Government that had provoked it, and of the situation in France since the surrender of Metz. He was sincerely sorry for the defeat of France, but it did not astonish him, for he knew well that Prussia had long been prepared for this war, and he had never ceased, while there was still time, from warning those who then ruled France. But his good advice had found no hearing. He was full of admiration for the resistance of Paris and the splendid spirit of the provinces, but he was afraid that all these prodigious efforts would have no success. “The best thing you can do,” said he, “would be to conclude peace as promptly as possible.” And he repeatedly cited the example of his own country and reminded me of what Austria had done after the disastrous Battle of Sadowa. I find it difficult to describe the insistence and animation with which he showed that all further efforts must be hopeless, and that there was nothing left but to accept the evidence and conclude peace without prolonging our resistance. “The more you delay the more you are weakening yourselves--without speaking of the irritation you are causing the enemy, who will augment his demands as he advances his troops further and further into the heart of the country. Take the advice of a sincere friend of France; surrender and make peace.” I did not hide from him that France had not yet reached the extremity of concluding peace at any cost or under any conditions which the conqueror would impose on us. “It is quite true we have lost our last army at Metz; but Paris, the great city, can hold out for a long time yet. Paris will stop the enemy and give the provinces a chance of forming new troops.” He shook his head and said simply: “You can no longer stop the invasion, and it is better for you to surrender to-day than to-morrow.” I then told him that the Powers also were interested in the result of this war, because the equilibrium of Europe and their own security was menaced by the weakening of France and the undue aggrandisement of Prussia. “Is it not true that Europe has need of France, and of an unlessened, unmutilated France, in its own interests and in order to establish the balance of power in face of the menacing superiority of Prussia? “In their own interests the Powers ought to cast aside their apathy and leave their rôle of quiet spectator in order to raise their voices and signify to Prussia that all Europe wishes this war terminated by a durable peace, by a peace which France can whole-heartedly accept. I find it difficult to assume that Prussia, victorious as she is, can disregard such intervention.”