subjects, because princes are no less bound by oath to their subjects, than are the subjects to their princes: and therefore ought it to be kept and performed equally, according to law and condition of the oath that is made of either party.' By comparing which two testimonies together, we may see the reasons, why neither of the two royal brothers, that have ruled in our day, could be conscientiously owned as magistrates, in the case they have been in for several years past: the first testimony is for the second brother, the latter is for the first that's gone. But, as for Mr. Knox's opinion, it is evident he had written a book against the government of women; which though he did not intend it particularly against Mary of Scotland, yet it did invalidate her authority as well as other women's. This book he owns and maintains, in his first conference with her, and consequently could not own her authority as of the Lord, tho' he gave her common respect, as the title of majesty, &c. yet when he was particularly urged by the Queen's question, you think, said she, 'That I have no just authority;' he would not answer in the affirmative, but shifted it, by telling her, 'That learned men, in all ages, have had their judgment free, and most commonly disagreeing from the common judgment of the world. And though, he says, he could live under her government (so may, and would the greatest disowners of tyranny, if they be not troubled with questions about owning it) yet he affirms that with the testimony of a good conscience, he had communicated his judgment to the world, and that if the realm found no inconveniences in her government, he would no further disallow than within his own breast.' Certainly then, in his conscience, he did not, and could not own her, as the magistrate of God; and that though many things which before were holden stable, had been called in doubt, yet neither protestant nor papist could prove, that any such question was, at any time, moved in public or private. Neither could ever such a question be moved, if the conscience were not posed; and then, when it must speak, it must of necessity be unpleasant to tyrants. Thus we have heard both the positions and scruples of this witness; let us also hear his arguings, that people may punish princes for their idolatry and murder, &c. and therefore much more may disown them: and therefore again much more may they forbear to own them, when called; for can a dead man, by law, be owned to be a magistrate, and keeper of the law. 'Idolatry' (saith he in his conference with Lethington) 'ought not only to be suppressed, but the idolater ought to die the death; but by whom? By the people of God, for the commandment was given to Israel; yea, a command, that if it be heard that idolatry is committed in any one city, that then the whole body of the people arise and destroy that city, sparing neither man, woman, nor child. But shall the king also be