A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War — John Shaqi
A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
I shall not detain the reader with any detailed account of
the abortive insurrection of 1715. The operations entailed by
an invasion of England from the north are always the same. The
occupation of Stirling cuts off the Highlands from the Lowlands,
and bars any advance from the extreme north. An invasion from the
Lowlands may be checked on either flank of the Cheviots, on the
east coast at the lines of the Tweed or the Tyne, or, if headed
back from thence, on the west coast at the line of the Ribble.
If both Highlands and Lowlands are in revolt, there is the third
resource of a simultaneous attack from north and south upon
Stirling. This last course lay open to the insurgents on this
occasion but was not accepted. The two decisive engagements were
accordingly fought, one at Sheriffmuir, a little to the north of
Stirling, the other at Preston, whither the insurgents of the
Lowlands, checked by an insignificant force on the east coast, made
a hopeless and futile march to the west, and were enveloped by
English forces marching simultaneously from east, west, and south.
None the less the peril to England was great. The force at Stirling
was far too weak for the duty assigned to it; and Sheriffmuir was
one of those doubtful actions from which each army emerges with one
wing defeated and the other victorious. The English force on the
Tweed was made up of raw recruits, and was so weak in numbers that
General Carpenter, a veteran of Flanders and Spain, who commanded
it, accomplished his work chiefly by the bold face with which
he met a dangerous position. Such was the military impotence of
England after a bare two years of peace.[7]
[Sidenote: 1716.]
[Sidenote: 1717.]
The panic caused by the insurrection swelled the military estimates
of 1716 very considerably. Apart from the new regiments raised for
the occasion, the strength of every existing troop and company had
been augmented, while the addition of a battalion to each regiment
of Guards increased the brigade to the total of seven battalions,
which constituted its strength unaltered almost for the next two
centuries. The full establishment voted by Parliament for Great
Britain was thirty-six thousand men, exclusive of course of troops
in Ireland, and of six thousand Dutchmen, who had been sent over
by the States-General in fulfilment of obligations by treaty.
The very next year, however, saw the establishment diminished by
one-fourth, and in May the King announced that he had given orders
to reduce the army by ten thousand men more. The estimates for 1718
accordingly provided for but sixteen thousand men in Great Britain,
while those for 1719 diminished even that handful by one-fourth,
and brought the total down to the figure of twelve thousand men.
[Sidenote: 1718.]
[Sidenote: 1719.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account