A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
Having secured his eighteen thousand men, Walpole resolved that
in future this number should form the regular strength for the
British Establishment. In 1727 the menace of a war with Spain
brought about the addition of eight thousand men, but in 1730 the
former establishment was resumed and regularly voted year after
year until the outbreak of the Spanish War in 1739. Year after
year, of course, the same factious motives for reduction were put
forward and the same futile arguments repeated for the hundredth
time. "Slavery under the guise of an army for protection of our
liberties" was one favourite phrase, while the valour of the
untrained Briton was the theme of many an orator. Men who, like
Sir William Yonge and William Pulteney, had held the office of
Secretary-at-War, were, when in opposition, as loud as the loudest
and as foolish as the most foolish in such displays. "I hope,
sir," said the former in 1732, "that we have men enough in Great
Britain who have resolution enough to defend themselves against any
invasion whatever, though there were not so much as one red-coat
in the whole kingdom." On the side of the Government the counter
arguments were drawn from an excellent source, namely, from the
disastrous results of wholesale disbandment after the Peace of
Ryswick. The establishment was, in fact, far too small. It would
have been impossible (to use Walpole's own words) even after
several weeks' time to mass five thousand men at any one point to
meet invasion, without stripping the capital of its defences and
leaving it at the mercy of open and secret enemies.
Foiled in its attempts to reduce the numbers of the Army,
the Opposition sought to weaken it by interference with its
administration and discipline, for which mischief the discussion
of the Mutiny Act gave annual opportunity. Here again it was
Walpole who set the evil example. He it was who maintained that the
Irish Establishment must be counted as part of the standing Army,
who insinuated that the British regiments, with their enormous
preponderance of officers as compared with men, were potentially
far stronger than they seemed to be, who encouraged the Commons
to dictate to the military authorities the proportion that should
be observed between horse, foot, and dragoons.[21] He too it was
who imperilled the passing of the Mutiny Act by advancing the old
commonplace that a court-martial in time of peace was unknown to
English law, and that mutiny and desertion should be punished by
the civil magistrate. He it was once more who blamed the ministry
for sending the fleet to the Mediterranean instead of keeping it at
home to guard the coast, and gave his authority to the false idea
that the function of a British fleet in war is to lie at anchor in
British ports. Such were the aberrations of a conscience which fell
blind directly it moved outside the circle of office.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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