A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
After eight years of experience of Bonaparte as an ally, the rulers
of Spain ought to have known that his silence during the campaigns of
Eylau and Friedland boded them no good. But his present intentions
escaped them, and they hastened to atone for the proclamation of
Oct. 5 by a servile obedience to all the orders which he sent them.
The most important of these was the command to mobilize and send
to the Baltic 15,000 of their best troops [March, 1807]. This was
promptly done, the depleted battalions and squadrons being raised to
war-strength, by drafts of men and horses which disorganized dozens
of the corps that remained at home[10]. The reason alleged, the fear
of Swedish and English descents on the rear of the Grand Army, was
plausible, but there can be no doubt that the real purpose was to
deprive Spain of a considerable part, and that the most efficient, of
her disposable forces. If Godoy could have listened to the interviews
of Napoleon and Alexander of Russia at Tilsit, he would have been
terrified at the offhand way in which the Emperor suggested to the
Czar that the Balearic Isles should be taken from Spain and given to
Ferdinand of Naples, if the latter would consent to cede Sicily to
Joseph Napoleon[11]. To despoil his allies was quite in the usual
style of Bonaparte--Godoy cannot have forgotten the lot of Trinidad
and Ceylon--but he had not before proposed to tear from Spain, not a
distant colony, but an ancient province of the Aragonese crown. The
project was enshrined in the ‘secret and supplementary’ clauses of the
Treaty of Tilsit, which Napoleon wished to conceal till the times were
ripe.
[10] The demand was made in the most peremptory fashion, and
in almost threatening language. Napoleon writes to Talleyrand
that the Spanish division in Tuscany, which was to form part of
the expeditionary corps, must march in twenty-four hours after
receiving its orders. ‘If they refuse, everything is at an end,’
a most sinister phrase (Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 25, 1807).
[11] This was Article IV of the Seven ‘Secret Articles’ of the
Treaty of Tilsit. See for this proposal the notes in Vandal’s
_Napoléon et Alexandre Ier_, vol. i.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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