A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
certain that if he had gone on, Victor would have made mincemeat of
his little force of 4,000 men.
[15] For these changes see Appendix I.
[16] Perreimond’s brigade of Latour-Maubourg’s division.
Although the advance of Venegas and Senra soon stopped short, the
news that the Spaniards were descending in force into the plain
of New Castile was most discomposing to King Joseph, who was at
this moment very weak in troops. Lefebvre had just started on his
eccentric march to Avila: Dessolles was not yet back from the north,
and there was no disposable reserve at Madrid save the single
division of Ruffin, for the king’s guards and Leval’s Germans were
barely enough to hold down the capital, and could not be moved. The
situation was made worse by the revolt of several of the small towns
of the upper Tagus, including Chinchon and Colmenar, which rose under
the belief that Infantado’s army would soon be at their gates. There
was nothing between the duke and Madrid save the single infantry
division of Villatte, which lay with Marshal Victor at Aranjuez, and
the six dragoon regiments of Latour-Maubourg, a force of little more
than 9,000 sabres and bayonets.
Fortunately for King Joseph, Infantado was a most incapable general,
and allowed his opportunity to slip by. By driving in the French
cavalry screen, he had given notice of his existence, and spread
alarm up to the gates of Madrid. But in order to profit by the
situation he should have dashed in at once, before the enemy had time
to draw together. If he had marched from Cuenca with his reserves, in
the wake of Venegas, he could have brought 20,000 men to bear upon
Victor, before the latter could receive the very moderate succours
that King Joseph could send him. Instead of doing anything of the
kind, he remained quiescent at his head quarters, and did not even
send Venegas any further orders, either to advance or to retreat.
From December 26 to January 11, the Spanish vanguard lay at Tarancon,
as if with the express intention of giving the French time to
concentrate. The duke meanwhile, as his dispatches show, was drawing
up a grandiose plan of operations, which included not only the
eviction of King Joseph from Madrid, but the cutting of Napoleon’s
communication and the raising of the siege of Saragossa! He was
most anxious to induce the Central Junta to move forward all their
other forces to aid him. But they could do nothing, so deplorable
was the state of their army, but bid the weak division of 6,000 men,
which was guarding the Sierra Morena, to begin a demonstration in
La Mancha. In pursuance of this order Del Palacio made a forward
movement, as dangerous as it was useless, to Villaharta on the upper
Guadiana.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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