[42] Napier enlarges on this incident at great length in pages 14-19 of his second volume. In his persistent dislike for Canning, Castlereagh and Mr. Frere, as well as for the Spaniards, he concludes that the business ‘indicated an unsettled policy, shallow combination, and had agents on the part of the British Cabinet, and an unwise and unworthy disposition in the Supreme Junta,’ while Smith was ‘zealous and acute’ and Cradock ‘full of zeal and moral courage.’ It is hard to give an unqualified assent to any one of these views. Smith was wrong in acting without giving any notice of his intentions to the Junta: Cradock’s zeal was equally untempered by discretion. The British Cabinet, acting on the information available in the end of December, was right to be anxious about Cadiz, and equally right to abandon its attempt to occupy the place in March, when the conditions of the war had changed, and the Junta had shown its dislike to the proposal. As to the Spaniards, the matter was only broached to them in February, when the danger of an immediate French advance had passed away, and they were entirely justified in their answer, which was framed as politely as could be contrived. We must not blame them overmuch for their suspicion: England, though now a friend, had long been an enemy--and the fate of Gibraltar was always before their eyes. But this unfortunate incident has detained us too long; we must return to the state of the Spanish armies at the end of the month of January. Beyond the levies of the Marquis Del Palacio at La Carolina, there was a long gap in the Spanish line of defence. The next force under arms was the army of Infantado, now engaged in its exhausting winter march from Cuenca to the Murcian border. After the rout of Ucles it was still 12,000 strong, though destitute of all supplies and not fit for immediate service. The Junta ordered it to march from Chinchilla to join Del Palacio’s force at the mouth of the Despeña Perros, and so to strengthen the defences of Andalusia. This was done, and the two forces were safely united, so that when a few more new battalions had been brought up from Granada, 20,000 men were placed between Victor and Andalusia. The Junta removed Infantado from command, rightly judging that he had sacrificed Venegas at Ucles by his neglect to send orders and his sloth in coming up to join his subordinate. The charge of the force at La Carolina (still called ‘the Army of the Centre’) was made over to General Cartaojal.