A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
This busy and ambitious man had taken up his abode in Granada, after
Soult’s departure on September 23rd, and since then had not stirred,
though Wellington had repeatedly asked him to advance into La Mancha
with his available force, and to put himself in touch with Elio,
Penne Villemur, and Hill. But Ballasteros was suffering from an acute
attack of megalomania: after years of skulking in the mountains and
forced marches, he was now in the position of a viceroy commanding
the resources of a great province. Though Andalusia had been cleared
of the French by no merit of his, but as a side-effect of the battle
of Salamanca, he gave himself the airs of a conqueror and deliverer,
and fully believed himself to be the most important person in Spain.
As an acute observer remarked, ‘Ballasteros wanted to begin where
Bonaparte ended, by seizing supreme authority, though he had performed
no such services for his fatherland as the French general. He spared
no effort to attach his army to his person, and to win its favour
sacrificed without hesitation the whole civil population. The land was
drained of all resources, but he found new means of extorting money.
His officers went from town to town exacting a so-called “voluntary
contribution” for the army. Those who gave much were put in his white
book as patriots--those who did not were enrolled in his black book
as supporters of King Joseph. He wanted to collect all the troops in
Andalusia into a great army, with himself as commander. But the Regency
directed him, in accordance with Wellington’s advice, to march at once
with the troops immediately available and take post in La Mancha[77].’
Then came the news of Wellington’s nomination as commander-in-chief.
Ballasteros thought the moment favourable for an open bid for the
dictatorship. Instead of obeying the orders sent, he issued on October
23rd a manifesto directed to the Regency, in which he declared that
Wellington’s appointment to supreme power was an insult to the Spanish
nation, and especially to the Spanish Army. He openly contemned the
decree, as dishonourable and debasing--Spaniards should never become
like Portuguese the servants of the foreigner. If--what he could not
believe--the national army and the nation itself should ratify such
an appointment, he himself would throw up his post and retire to his
home. At the same time there was an outburst of pamphlets and newspaper
articles inspired by him, stating that England was to be feared as an
oppressor no less than France; and all sorts of absurd rumours were put
about as to the intentions of the British Government and the servility
of the Cortes.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account