some other person_; and inasmuch as the right is a right of property, capable of being recognized and asserted by proceedings _before a court of justice between parties adverse to each other_, it constitutes, in the strictest sense, a _controversy_ between parties, and a case arising under the Constitution of the United States, within the express delegation of judicial power given by that instrument." (16 _Peters_, 616.) Hence your commissioners are, in the _strictest sense_, judges, exercising "judicial power" delegated by the Constitution. You pronounce Mr. Crittenden "legal authority of the highest kind." This legal authority understands the sixth section of your law as providing that each commissioner "shall have judicial power and jurisdiction to hear, examine, and decide the case in a summary manner." Now, if a man, having judicial power and jurisdiction to decide controversies between parties adverse to each other, in controversies arising under the Constitution and within the express delegation of judicial power given by that instrument, is not a judge, do tell us who is one. Once more, Sir, Mr. Crittenden says, "The legal authority of every tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction, where no appeal lies, is of necessity conclusive upon every tribunal; and therefore the judgment of the tribunal created by this act is conclusive upon all other tribunals." So your commissioner is not only a judge, but he constitutes a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction, and his judgment is binding even upon the Supreme Court of the United States. And yet, Sir, you must deny that this omnipotent commissioner is a judge, or you must admit, that, in the mode of his appointment, you have flagrantly violated the Constitution of your country.