Now it appears to me that a Monitorial system of this nature is either nugatory, or worse. If the Monitors thus commissioned have the ordinary feelings of the sons of Gentlemen, they will virtually repudiate such an office. They will say, I was not sent here to be an Usher—a Master’s spy, a Master’s informer. They have too much self-respect, too nice a sense of honour, to live amongst their Schoolfellows on terms of unguarded equality, and then use the knowledge thus gained as a means of drawing down upon them the arm of authority and of punishment. The result will be, as it always has been wherever such a view has been taken of Monitorial duty, that the Monitors will not act for the purposes for which they were commissioned, but only for the maintenance of a selfish dignity which looks for its support to other means than those recognized by the system. It astonishes me that those who regard submission to a corporal punishment as a degradation inconsistent with honour and self-respect, should look with toleration upon that _antagonist_ system under which their sons might be called upon, as the reward of ability and diligence, to assume the office of a delegated spy. The alternative—as I believe, the _only_ alternative—is that form of Monitorial discipline which it has been my endeavour to carry into vigorous operation at Harrow during the last nine years. I have taught the Monitors to regard their authority as emanating indeed from mine, and responsible to mine, but yet (with the limitation naturally arising from these two considerations) independent and free in its ordinary exercise. They are charged with the enforcement of an internal discipline, the object of which is the good order, the honourable conduct, the gentlemanlike tone, of the Houses and of the School. In these matters I desire that they should act for themselves; knowing well how doubly, how tenfold, valuable is that discipline which springs from within the body, in comparison with that which is imposed upon it from above. It is only on the discovery of grave and moral offences, such as would be poisonous to the whole society, and such as they may reasonably be expected to regard as discreditable and disgraceful even more than they are illegal, that I expect them to communicate to me officially the faults of which they may take notice. In certain cases, it may be optional whether an offence should be regarded as one against manners or against morals; and in these instances it will depend upon the accident of the prior discovery, whether it be taken up by the Monitors or by myself. It follows as a matter of necessity that the Monitors should possess some means of exercising and asserting their authority.