[Sidebar (page 17)] Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, the commander of Task Force 14, is the subject of much historical “Monday morning quarterbacking.” All these commentators have the benefit of something neither Pye, the overall commander, nor Fletcher, on the scene, had--hindsight. As “Soc” McMorris (Admiral Kimmel’s war plans officer) put it, “We had no more idea’n a billygoat,” about what Japanese forces lay off Wake. The welter of message traffic linking CruDivs, CarDivs, and BatDivs with land-based air painted a formidable picture of what might be encountered by a _single_ U.S. Navy carrier task force. While the Navy pilots may have been well trained, _Saratoga_’s embarked fighter squadron was understrength, having only 13 operational Wildcats. [Illustration] Nor could the Marines of VMF-221 (bound for Wake) have been counted on as an effective adjunct to _Saratoga_’s squadron, since they had not operated from a carrier. An even more compelling argument for how VMF-221 would have performed in the emergency is that Major General Ross Rowell, commanding the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, knowing of 221’s manpower and operational deficiencies, lamented having to send “[Major Verne] McCaul’s half-baked outfit into that mess.” Rowell knew that maintaining the temperamental Brewster F2A-3 Buffalo fighters at a stateside air base with all the conveniences had been a chore--let alone having to operate the F2A-3 at an advance base (especially one that had been so badly cut-up as Wake had been) or at sea on a carrier (where the F2A’s performance--especially with landing gear failures--was nearly infamous). And, too, the three carriers committed to the relief expedition were all there were in the Pacific. There were no reserves. Even though the Japanese harbored no ideas of conquest of Hawaii at that time--they were through with Oahu for the time being--Pye and his advisors had no way of knowing that. What intelligence existed pointed toward a potential disaster for an island where the issue was, as Cunningham correctly perceived, very much in doubt! When asked in 1970 if the relief expedition’s arrival would have made any difference in the outcome at Wake, retired Brigadier General Devereux answered: “I rather doubt that that particular task force, with its size and composition, could have been very effective.... I think it was wise ... to pull back.” ] ‘_All Hands Have Behaved Splendidly_’ Shortly before 1600 on 20 December, scrutinized by Wake Island’s only serviceable F4F, a Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boat bearing mail landed in the lagoon. It arrived in the midst of a rain squall, but the defenders welcomed the precipitation because it worsened the flying weather and inhibited the Japanese bombing efforts. Commander Keene’s sailors moored the Catalina and fueled it for the next morning’s flight.