Nevertheless, there are characteristics of Dream which appear to indicate a suspension of activity in some parts of the intellectual mechanism. Although perfectly conscious of the presence of the dream, we are unable to discover that it is not real; we cannot discern incongruities, nor recognize impossibilities. The dead of long ago come to us and we are not amazed. We walk the waters and float in the air and are not astonished. Nothing is too impossible to be done and nothing too monstrous to be implicitly believed. We are, in fact, insane in dream. What is the solution of this problem? Some faculty that corrects the action of the mind when we are awake is certainly absent or paralysed during dream. Something must come to us from without or operate upon the mind within that restores us to sanity when we wake, enabling us then to discern the false from the true, the shadow from the substance, the impossible from the possible. What is this absent faculty? The solution most favoured by psychologists is that in sleep we lack the correcting influence of the senses. The mind, they say, having nothing wherewith to compare its own creations, necessarily accepts them as realities; it puts implicit faith in them, however monstrous, simply because they are presented to it as facts and in the same manner as facts are presented when it is awake. I confess to great doubt if this explanation be adequate. True, that we believe the impossibilities of our dreams _to be_ because they appear to the mind to be. But that does not explain the strange absence of perplexity and wonder when we witness (as we then verily believe) the dead alive, the distant near, and impossible things performed with ease. In our waking state, if the like dreams come into the mind at some moment of idleness, they are never mistaken for realities. Reason rejects them, and if entertained for awhile it is only as a pleasant vision. Nor is the problem solved by the suggested slumber of the reasoning faculties. These are not always asleep in dream, for often we dream that we are exercising them readily and effectively. The power of reasoning employed in dream is, however, very limited. It can exercise itself on the subject of the dream, but not upon its surroundings. It is not uncommon for the sleeper to dream that he is making a speech or preaching a sermon. The discourse is argumentative and logical. It is not merely that he dreams he is logical; he is so in fact, for the dream is often remembered after waking and no flaw is found in the argument. Nevertheless, at the moment that our reasoning faculties are constructing a strictly logical and perfectly rational discourse, they are unable to inform us—as when we are awake they would have done—that the place where we suppose the speech to be spoken, the occurrence and the occasion, are not merely fictitious but attended with the most palpable absurdities.