And the knowledge we shall acquire will be much more one of the sense and feeling than of the reason. We do not want to have a rule in our minds by which we can recall the positions of the different cubes, but we want to have an immediate apprehension of them. It was Kant who first pointed out how much of thought there was embodied in the sense impressions; and it is this embodied thought which we wish to form. CHAPTER IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE. Both in science and in morals there is an important distinction to be drawn between theory and practice. A knowledge of chemistry does not consist in the intellectual appreciation of different theories and principles, but in being able to act in accordance with the facts of chemical combination, so that by means of the appliances of chemistry practical results are produced. And so in morals--the theoretic acquaintance with the principles of human action may consist with a marked degree of ignorance of how to act amongst other human beings. Now the use of the word “learn” has been much restricted to merely theoretic studies. It requires to be enlarged to the scientific meaning. And to know, should include practice in actual manipulation. Let us take an instance. We all know what justice is, and any child can be taught to tell the difference between acting justly and acting unjustly. But it is a different thing to teach them to act with justice. Something is done which affects them unpleasantly. They feel an impulse to retaliate. In order to see what justice demands they have to put their personal feeling on one side. They have to get rid of those conditions under which they apprehended the effects of the action at first, and they have to look on it from another point of view. Then they have to act in accordance with this view. Now there are two steps--one an intellectual one of understanding, one a practical one of carrying out the view. Neither is a moral step. One demands intelligence, the other the formation of a habit, and this habit can be inculcated by precept, by reward and punishment, by various means. But as human nature is constituted, if the habit of justice is inculcated it touches a part of the being. There is an emotional response. We know but little of a human being, but we can safely say that there are depths in it, beyond the feelings of momentary resentment and the stimulus of pleasurable or painful sensation, to which justice is natural. How little adequate is our physical knowledge of a human being as a bodily frame to explain the fact of human life. Now and again we see one of these isolated beings bound up in another, as if there was an undiscovered physical bond between them. And in all there is this sense of justice--a kind of indwelling verdict of the universal mind, if we may use such an expression, in virtue of which a man feels not as a single individual but as all men.