With respect to justice, it is not only necessary to take the view of one other person than oneself, but that of many. There may be justice which is very good justice from the point of view of a party, but very bad justice from the point of view of a nation. And if we suppose an agency outside the human race, gifted with intelligence, and affecting the race, in the way for instance of causing storms or disturbances of the ground, in order to judge it with justice we should have to take a standpoint outside the race of men altogether. We could not say that this agency was bad. We should have to judge it with reference to its effect on other sentient beings. There are some words which are often used in contrast with each other--egoism and altruism; and each seems to me unmeaning except as terms in a contrast. Let us take an instance. A boy has a bag of cakes, and is going to enjoy them by himself. His parent stops him, and makes him set up some stumps and begin to learn to play cricket with another boy. The enjoyment of the cakes is lost--he has given that up; but after a little while he has a pleasure which is greater than that of cakes in solitude. He enters into the life of the game. He has given up, or been forced to give up, the pleasure he knew, and he has found a greater one. What he thought about himself before was that he liked cakes, now what he thinks about himself is that he likes cricket. Which of these is the true thought about himself? Neither, probably, but at any rate it is more near the truth to say that he likes the cricket. If now we use the word self to mean that which a person knows of himself, and it is difficult to see what other meaning it can have, his self as he knew it at first was thwarted, was given up, and through that he discovered his true self. And again with the cricket; he will make the sacrifice of giving that up, voluntarily or involuntarily, and will find a truer self still. In general there is not much difficulty in making a boy find out that he likes cricket; and it is quite possible for him to eat his cakes first and learn to play cricket afterwards--the cricket will not come to him as a thwarting in any sense of what he likes better. But this ease in entering in to the pursuit only shows that the boy’s nature is already developed to the level of enjoying the game. The distinct moral advance would come in such a case when something which at first was hard to him to do was presented to him--and the hardness, the unpleasantness is of a double kind, the giving up of a pursuit or indulgence to which he is accustomed, and the exertion of forming the habits demanded by the new pursuit.