A Philosophical Essay on ProbabilitiesLaplace, Pierre Simon, marquis de
Philosophy
A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities
Laplace, Pierre Simon, marquis de
Probabilities
If one considers a series of objects of the same nature one perceives
among them and in their changes ratios which manifest themselves more
and more in proportion as the series is prolonged, and which, extending
and generalizing continually, lead finally to the principle from which
they were derived. But these ratios are enveloped by so many strange
circumstances that it requires great sagacity to disentangle them and to
recur to this principle: it is in this that the true genius of sciences
consists. Analysis and natural philosophy owe their most important
discoveries to this fruitful means, which is called _induction_. Newton
was indebted to it for his theorem of the binomial and the principle of
universal gravity. It is difficult to appreciate the probability of the
results of induction, which is based upon this that the simplest ratios
are the most common; this is verified in the formulæ of analysis and is
found again in natural phenomena, in crystallization, and in chemical
combinations. This simplicity of ratios will not appear astonishing if
we consider that all the effects of nature are only mathematical results
of a small number of immutable laws.
Yet induction, in leading to the discovery of the general principles of
the sciences, does not suffice to establish them absolutely. It is
always necessary to confirm them by demonstrations or by decisive
experiences; for the history of the sciences shows us that induction has
sometimes led to inexact results. I shall cite, for example, a theorem
of Fermat in regard to prime numbers. This great geometrician, who had
meditated profoundly upon this theorem, sought a formula which,
containing only prime numbers, gave directly a prime number greater than
any other number assignable. Induction led him to think that two, raised
to a power which was itself a power of two, formed with unity a prime
number. Thus, two raised to the square plus one, forms the prime number
five; two raised to the second power of two, or sixteen, forms with one
the prime number seventeen. He found that this was still true for the
eighth and the sixteenth power of two augmented by unity; and this
induction, based upon several arithmetical considerations, caused him to
regard this result as general. However, he avowed that he had not
demonstrated it. Indeed, Euler recognized that this does not hold for
the thirty-second power of two, which, augmented by unity, gives
4,294,967,297, a number divisible by 641.
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