When an assembly has to choose among several candidates who present themselves for one or for several places of the same kind, that which appears simplest is to have each voter write upon a ticket the names of all the candidates according to the order of merit that he attributes to them. Supposing that he classifies them in good faith, the inspection of these tickets will give the results of the elections in such a manner that the candidates may be compared among themselves; so that new elections can give nothing more in this regard. It is a question now to conclude the order of preference which the tickets establish among the candidates. Let us imagine that one gives to each voter an urn which contains an infinity of balls by means of which he is able to shade all the degrees of merit of the candidates; let us conceive again that he draws from his urn a number of balls proportional to the merit of each candidate, and let us suppose this number written upon a ticket at the side of the name of the candidate. It is clear that by making a sum of all the numbers relative to each candidate upon each ticket, that one of all the candidates who shall have the largest sum will be the candidate whom the assembly prefers; and that in general the order of preference of the candidates will be that of the sums relative to each of them. But the tickets do not mark at all the number of balls which each voter gives to the candidates; they indicate solely that the first has more of them than the second, the second more than the third, and so on. In supposing then at first upon a given ticket a certain number of balls all the combinations of the inferior numbers which fulfil the preceding conditions are equally admissible; and one will have the number of balls relative to each candidate by making a sum of all the numbers which each combination gives him and dividing it by the entire number of combinations. A very simple analysis shows that the numbers which must be written upon each ticket at the side of the last name, of the one before the last, etc., are proportional to the terms of the arithmetical progression 1, 2, 3, etc. Writing then thus upon each ticket the terms of this progression, and adding the terms relative to each candidate upon these tickets, the divers sums will indicate by their magnitude the order of their preference which ought to be established among the candidates. Such is the mode of election which The Theory of Probabilities indicates. Without doubt it would be better if each voter should write upon his ticket the names of the candidates in the order of merit which he attributes to them. But particular interests and many strange considerations of merit would affect this order and place sometimes in the last rank the candidate most formidable to that one whom one prefers, which gives too great an advantage to the candidates of mediocre merit. Likewise experience has caused the abandonment of