this mode of election in the societies which had adopted it. The election by the absolute majority of the suffrages unites to the certainty of not admitting any one of the candidates whom this majority rejects, the advantage of expressing most often the desire of the assembly. It always coincides with the preceding mode when there are only two candidates. Indeed it exposes an assembly to the inconvenience of rendering elections interminable. But experience has shown that this inconvenience is nil, and that the general desire to put an end to elections soon unites the majority of the suffrages upon one of the candidates. The choice among several propositions relative to the same object ought to be subjected, seemingly, to the same rules as the election among several candidates. But there exists between the two cases this difference, namely, that the merit of a candidate does not exclude that of his competitors; but if it is necessary to choose among propositions which are contrary, the truth of the one excludes the truth of the others. Let us see how one ought then to view this question. Let us give to each voter an urn which contains an infinite number of balls, and let us suppose that he distributes them upon the divers propositions according to the respective probabilities which he attributes to them. It is clear that the total number of balls expressing certainty, and the voter being by the hypothesis assured that one of the propositions ought to be true, he will distribute this number at length upon the propositions. The problem is reduced then to this, namely, to determine the combinations in which the balls will be distributed in such a manner that there may be more of them upon the first proposition of the ticket than upon the second, more upon the second than upon the third, etc.; to make the sums of all the numbers of balls relative to each proposition in the divers combinations, and to divide this sum by the number of combinations; the quotients will be the numbers of balls that one ought to attribute to the propositions upon a certain ticket. One finds by analysis that in going from the last proposition these quotients are among themselves as the following quantities: first, unity divided by the number of propositions; second, the preceding quantity, augmented by unity, divided by the number of propositions less one; third, this second quantity, augmented by unity, divided by the number of propositions less two, and so on for the others. One will write then upon each ticket these quantities at the side of the corresponding propositions, and adding the relative quantities to each proposition upon the divers tickets the sums will indicate by their magnitude the order of preference which the assembly gives to these propositions.